

REMUNERATION REPORT 2024

CONTENT

2	REMUNERATION OF THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS
2	The 2024 fiscal year
3	Remuneration in 2024 at a glance
5	Outlook for remuneration in the subsequent years
8	Overview of the remuneration components
10	Details of fixed remuneration
11	Details of variable remuneration
18	Application of malus and clawback provisions
18	Loans
19	Target remuneration of the Board of Management in the 2024 fiscal year
22	Total remuneration for the 2024 fiscal year
24	Remuneration awarded and due in accordance with section 162 (1), sentence 2, of the German stock corporation act (<i>Aktiengesetz – AktG</i>)
29	Observance of remuneration caps
30	Remuneration of former Board of Management members in accordance with section 162 (1), sentence 2, of the German Stock Corporation Act (<i>Aktiengesetz – AktG</i>)
31	REMUNERATION OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD
34	REMUNERATION OF THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS, THE SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS AND THE EMPLOYEES ON A FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT BASIS RELATIVE TO THE COMPANY'S EARNINGS PERFORMANCE
36	REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR ON THE FORMAL AUDIT OF THE REMUNERATION REPORT PURSUANT TO § 162 ABS. 3 AKTG

REMUNERATION REPORT

The remuneration report provides detailed and individualized information on the remuneration awarded and due to the active and former members of the Board of Management and Supervisory Board of Deutsche Post AG in the 2024 fiscal year. It has been prepared by the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board in accordance with the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktengesetz – AktG). Information beyond what is included in this remuneration report concerning the remuneration system approved by the Annual General Meeting of 2021 for the Board of Management members and the remuneration adopted for the Supervisory Board members in the Annual General Meeting of 2022 can be found on the [company's website](#). On May 3, 2024, the Annual General Meeting approved the remuneration report for the 2023 fiscal year with a majority of 94.01% of the votes cast. No fundamental changes were therefore made to the presentation of remuneration and the transparent disclosure of the remuneration of the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board was continued for 2024. The 2024 remuneration report will be presented at the Annual General Meeting on May 2, 2025 for approval by the shareholders.

1. REMUNERATION OF THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS

The remuneration of the Board of Management members is based on the remuneration system adopted by the Supervisory Board in December 2020, which was approved at the Annual General Meeting of 2021 with a majority of 93.39% of the votes cast. The system is designed to provide incentives for the successful implementation of the corporate strategy as well as the sustainable development of the Group and is largely geared toward creating long-term value for shareholders. It complies with the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act and the recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code (Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex – the Code). Furthermore, the Supervisory Board aims to set the remuneration so that it is competitive and in line with market standards in order to attract and retain the best candidates for Board of Management positions. In structuring the remuneration, the Supervisory Board also ensures that it is aligned to the remuneration system for executives so that matching performance incentives are provided.

THE 2024 FISCAL YEAR

Business in 2024 was again shaped by the prolonged weakness of global economic growth. The divisions concentrated in the reporting period on the quality of their services, on price adjustments and on high levels of cost efficiency.

DHL Group generated EBIT of €5,886 million and a free cash flow of €2,944 million in 2024. The annual results show that, with its broad logistics portfolio, DHL Group remains very strongly and resiliently positioned in the still challenging macroeconomic environment and has structurally improved its profitability significantly compared with the pre-pandemic level (EBIT 2019: €4,128 million).

Strategy 2030, which was presented in September 2024, builds on this strong foundation and focuses on accelerated topline growth, further margin improvement and optimized capital allocation. The core component of the growth strategy is the concentration on high-growth industries, fast-growing regions, e-commerce and digital sales. The growth we are aiming for must be sustainable in two respects: It must be commercially sustainable, offering an attractive return on capital, while also being environmentally sustainable, appealing to those target segments and customer groups who are increasingly willing to invest in climate-friendly logistics services. DHL Group is convinced that sustainability will increasingly become a differentiator in the logistics market and aims to remain a frontrunner in low-carbon logistics. With the fourth bottom line “Green Logistics of Choice,” DHL Group has therefore fully integrated its ESG Roadmap 2021 into the Group Strategy. Our strategic approaches toward social responsibility and corporate governance also pursue specific objectives: to provide a safe and motivating working environment and to ensure transparent and legally compliant business practices throughout the Group.


REMUNERATION IN 2024 AT A GLANCE

The achievement of the financial targets for the annual bonus reflects the solid performance of DHL Group in the 2024 fiscal year in spite of the macroeconomic challenges, with the DHL divisions acting as the primary drivers of the business outcome. As expected, the central steering metric of EBIT after asset charge (EAC) fell short of the previous year's level. The reported free cash flow (FCF) was maintained at the prior-year level in spite of the difficult economic parameters. The strong FCF forms the basis to balance reliable, attractive shareholder returns with targeted growth investments as part of Strategy 2030.

With respect to the nonfinancial performance criteria, which consisted exclusively of ESG targets based on the company strategy, target achievement came in between around 113% and 125%. The degree of total target achievement for the annual bonus of Board of Management members for the 2024 fiscal year stood at between approximately 93% and approximately 105%. The target relevant for payment of the proportion of the annual bonus deferred in the 2022 fiscal year was reached, because the Group's EAC was cumulatively positive during the sustainability phase.

By contrast, in the case of the long-term component for which the lockup period ended in the reporting year (2020 SAR tranche), none of the six performance targets were reached, as the absolute increase in the price of Deutsche Post shares at the end of the lockup period was less than 10% compared with the base year and the relative performance versus the STOXX Europe 600 was negative. The 2020 SAR tranche therefore lapsed without replacement or compensation, meaning it will never give rise to any payments.

The following tables, which are broken down by individual variable remuneration components, provide an initial overview of the targets achieved by the Board of Management in the 2024 fiscal year:

ANNUAL BONUS 2024: OVERVIEW OF TARGET ACHIEVEMENT


¹ Financial targets (€m); Realized Decarbonization Effects (metric kilotonnes of CO₂e well-to-wheel); Employee Engagement (% approval); Cybersecurity Rating (points); EAC: EBIT after asset charge (including the asset charge on goodwill and before goodwill impairment); Group EAC is weighted at 50% for Board of Management members responsible for the divisions and the EAC of the respective division for which they are responsible at 10%. For the other members of the Board of Management, Group EAC is weighted at 60%.

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR 2022 MEDIUM-TERM COMPONENT

2022	2023	2024	Spring 2025
Annual bonus	Deferral		Determination of target achievement/payout
	CRITERION 1 ¹ : EAC 2024 > EAC 2022		2,207 < 5,117 ² ✘
	or		
	CRITERION 2 ¹ : EAC 2023 + 2024 > 0		2,860 + 2,207 > 0 ✔

¹ EAC (€m).

² EAC 2022 adjusted, see the 2023 Annual Report, note 4 to the consolidated financial statements.

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE 2020 SAR TRANCHE

SAR performance targets	Thresholds	Target achievement
Performance versus STOXX Europe 600	+10%	✗
	+0%	✗
Absolute increase in share price	+25%	✗
	+20%	✗
	+15%	✗
	+10%	✗

OUTLOOK FOR REMUNERATION IN THE SUBSEQUENT YEARS

Remuneration system starting from 2026

The Supervisory Board conducted an in-depth review of the Board of Management remuneration system in the reporting year. The objective was to appropriately reflect the further development of the strategic bottom lines, which form part of Strategy 2030, in the incentive system for members of the Board of Management. Another key focus of the revision was to take into account feedback from our investors and to modernize and simplify the remuneration system. The Supervisory Board was guided by the following considerations:

- Adapting the targets for short-term and long-term variable remuneration to the strategic priorities specified in Strategy 2030
- Option to incorporate the new, fourth bottom line “Green Logistics of Choice” into both short- and long-term variable remuneration
- Strengthening the “pay for performance” principle with a higher weighting of the long-term component in target remuneration and an increase in the maximum possible target achievement for variable remuneration
- Incorporating investor feedback, in particular on share ownership guidelines and compliance clawback
- Modernizing and simplifying the system, e.g. through abolishing the employer-financed company pension scheme

The revised remuneration system will be presented to the 2025 Annual General Meeting for approval. It will enter into force on January 1, 2026, and will apply to new contracts entered into from then onward. The Board of Management members have signaled their willingness to switch their existing Board of Management contracts over to the revised system.

A detailed description of the revised remuneration system can be found on the [company’s website](#). This also forms the basis for the vote on the remuneration system at the 2025 Annual General Meeting in accordance with Section 120a AktG. The main features of the new remuneration system and the considerations behind them are set out below:

ANNUAL BONUS FROM 2026

Target amount 0.8 x base salary	30% ESG targets	Target achievement: 0-200%	Payout In cash Maximum of 160% of the base salary from target achievement ² Payouts are also limited by the overall remuneration cap	Underlying considerations
	10% Free cash flow			
20% ¹ Divisional EBIT/ customer target(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Switch from EAC to EBIT – efficiency of employment of capital is to be measured in the long-term component in future • A 10 percentage points higher weighting of divisional targets serves to strengthen individual performance measurement • Annual determination of strategically relevant ESG targets opens up the possibility of setting priorities • Double dipping is avoided through the selection of different ESG performance criteria for the annual bonus and long-term component. In the case of multiple targets, the Supervisory Board ensures a suitable weighting of each individual target • Expansion of the target achievement corridor to 200% of the amount granted – greater incentive to overachieve on annual targets • Abolition of deferral – deferral unnecessary considering the strengthening of the long-term component 			
40% ¹ Group EBIT				

1 Weighting for Board of Management members with divisional responsibility, for the other Board of Management members: 60% Group EBIT, 0% divisional EBIT/customer target(s)
2 Increase/decrease for exceptional developments if applicable, factor 0.8-1.2

LONG-TERM VARIABLE REMUNERATION STARTING FROM 2026: PERFORMANCE SHARE PLAN

Term: 4 years ³				Underlying considerations
Target amount 1.6 x base salary	PSP performance targets	Target measurement	Weighting	
	TSR ¹ performance versus STOXX Europe 600	+0% to +25% outperformance Target value: 10%	1/3	
	ROIC ²	Target values are determined for each tranche	1/3	
	ESG targets	Targets are determined for each tranche	1/3	
Target achievement: 0-250%				Payout In cash 300% of target amount max Payouts are also limited by the overall remuneration cap
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Switch to a performance share plan (PSP) with a balanced risk/opportunity profile • Three equally weighted target categories – relative TSR, ROIC and ESG targets – take into account the interests of all stakeholders and create an incentive scheme to support the holistic implementation of Strategy 2030 • Raising the target amount to 1.6 x base salary – strengthening the incentive for the long-term and sustainable development of the company • Target achievement up to 250% creates a further incentive for overachieving on long-term strategic goals and contributes toward sustainable development • The payment amount is calculated in accordance with target achievement and taking into consideration the dividend equivalent • Restricting the maximum payment amount to 300% of the target amount for all Board of Management members serves to create a uniform incentive structure and represents an additional limiting element in the event of overachievement 				

1 Total Shareholder Return - TSR
2 Return on Invested Capital - ROIC
3 ROIC and ESG targets: Target values are determined based on medium-term planning, so 3-year performance period + 1 year holding period, TSR target: 4-year performance period

FURTHER MODIFICATIONS FROM 2026

	Component	Change
Fixed remuneration	Pension	Abolition of the employer-financed company pension scheme and switch to a pension substitute for personal provision, amount: unchanged at 35% of base salary
Other Provisions	Malus/ clawback	Addition to the existing withholding and clawback options through the introduction of an explicit right of clawback in the event of a compliance breach
	Share ownership guidelines	Introduction of share ownership guidelines Volumes: CEO: 1.5 x base salary, other Board of Management members: 1 x base salary

Outlook for remuneration in 2025

The remuneration of the Board of Management members in 2025 will still be based on the remuneration system adopted by the Supervisory Board in December 2020 and approved at the Annual General Meeting of 2021.

The EAC and FCF financial KPIs will remain target-relevant for the annual bonus. The switch to EBIT will only occur once the revised remuneration system comes into force starting in 2026, as the return on invested capital (ROIC) will then be used as a KPI in the long-term component to measure the effectiveness of the company’s use of capital. Retaining EAC for 2025 will ensure that the Board of Management is continuously measured on its ability to make efficient use of the capital available to DHL Group. The Board of Management will also continue to be measured by the company’s progress on targets in the areas of environment, social responsibility and governance (“ESG”) alongside the financial performance. The weighting of ESG criteria in the overall target portfolio for the annual bonus will remain at an unchanged 30%, with the individual ESG areas accounting for 10% each.

The Realized Decarbonization Effects KPI for the environmental aspect (“E”), the Employee Engagement KPI for the social responsibility aspect (“S”) and the Cybersecurity Rating for the governance aspect (“G”) will remain remuneration-relevant in 2025.

OVERVIEW OF THE REMUNERATION COMPONENTS

In accordance with the provisions of the remuneration system approved by the Annual General Meeting in 2021, the Board of Management's remuneration comprised the following components in 2024:

REMUNERATION COMPONENTS

Component	Objective	Design
Fixed remuneration		
Base salary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Serves to attract and retain Board of Management members who, due to their experience and expertise, are able to develop and successfully implement the strategy; simultaneously fosters an independent, risk-adjusted and autonomous management of the company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fixed, contractually agreed annual remuneration, generally paid monthly in 12 equal amounts
Fringe benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensures adequate income in retirement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mainly the personal use of a company car (including the services of a driver, if applicable), allowances for health and long-term care insurance in analogous application of the regulations and benefits under German social insurance law, and benefits in cases where two households are maintained
Pension commitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensures adequate income in retirement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual contribution of 35% of the base salary Pension contributions allocated up to and including 2020: interest rate in accordance with "iBoxx Corporates AA10+ Annual Yield," but at least 2.25% Pension contributions allocated as of 2021: interest rate in accordance with weighted annual interest rate of overall pension assets of all German pension schemes of Deutsche Post, however no less than 1%
Variable remuneration		
Annual bonus with medium-term component (deferral)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promotes profitable growth in consideration of the overall responsibility of the Board of Management, sustainable business development and the performance of the individual Board of Management members Provides incentives for Board of Management members to concentrate on successfully carrying out annual business priorities The deferred component, which is subject to an additional performance criterion, reinforces the focus of the Board of Management remuneration upon the company's long-term performance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target amount: 80% of the respective base salary Payout: 50% in the following year, 50% after an additional two years (sustainability phase), but only if the asset charge is earned at the end of the sustainability phase (medium-term component) Deferral designed as a malus provision 70% financial performance targets and 30% ESG targets Option for an increase/decrease of up to 20% in the event of exceptional developments Maximum amount (cap): 120% of the respective base salary possible in the event of exceptional developments
Long-term component – Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fosters sustainable, positive development of the company's value and aligns the interests of the Board of Management members to those of shareholders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plan type: Stock appreciation rights (SAR) Amount allocated: 100% of the base salary Personal investment: 10% of the base salary; the Board of Management members must execute the personal investment in shares of the company; by way of exception, it may also take the form of cash; in 2024, all Board of Management members executed the personal investment in shares Six equally weighted performance targets based on share price: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Absolute increase in share price (weighting: 4/6) Relative performance versus the STOXX Europe 600 (weighting: 2/6) Maximum amount (cap): 4 times the base salary (2.5 times the base salary for the CEO) Exercisability: based on performance targets reached after four years Cash payout: in the fifth or sixth year after allocation, depending on the individual exercise date

The following other contractual terms and conditions apply to all Board of Management members:

OTHER CONTRACTUAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Component	Details
Cap on maximum total remuneration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In addition to individual caps on the variable remuneration components, there is an overall cap; first of all, this limits the remuneration arising from target remuneration in a given year (target remuneration cap; cap on remuneration granted according to the terminology of the 2017 Code); since 2022, the payments attributable to a financial year have also been limited Cap for regular members of the Board of Management: €5.15 million (target remuneration cap up to and including 2020: €5 million excluding fringe benefits); amount of cap for CEO: €8.15 million (target remuneration cap up to and including 2020: €8 million excluding fringe benefits)
Malus and clawback provisions relating to variable remuneration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SARs are granted on the condition that the Supervisory Board may cap the payout amount in the event of any exceptional developments The Supervisory Board may also increase or decrease the annual bonus by up to 20% in the event of any exceptional developments 50% of the annual bonus resulting from target achievement is transferred into the medium-term component and is subject to a two-year sustainability phase; medium-term component will be withheld if the sustainability target EAC is not met during the sustainability phase The SARs granted are clawed back and lapse without replacement if and to the extent that the absolute or relative performance targets are not met during the four-year lock-up period The general statutory clawback rules additionally apply within the statutory limitation periods
Share ownership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As the targets are based on the share price, the LTIP is closely and directly aligned with shareholders' interests; this ensures matching interests Earnings potential per tranche: 2.5 times (CEO) or 4 times (Board of Management members) the base salary; cumulative effect over multiple years Personal investment of 10% of the annual base salary per LTIP tranche required from each Board of Management member, primarily in the form of shares of the company
Income from mandates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Remuneration from Group mandates: must be relinquished in full Remuneration from external mandates: does not have to be relinquished
Commitments in connection with the cessation of service on the Board of Management	
Change of control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Board of Management members have a right to early termination within six months after a change of control (effective from the end of the month subject to three months' notice); no right to claim severance payment upon the exercise of this right
Inability to work or death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Temporary inability to work: remuneration continued for 12 months or until the end of the contract at the latest Permanent inability to work: contract expires at the end of the quarter in which the permanent inability to work is determined Expiry of contract due to death or permanent inability to work: the annual base salary and maximum annual bonus, prorated in each case, continue to be paid for six months following the end of the month in which the Board of Management contract ends or until the scheduled expiration date of the contract, whichever is the earlier
Post-contractual non-compete clause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Duration: one year after leaving the Board of Management Compensation: one base salary Subject to deduction of income from other work, financial settlements and pension payments; the company may waive the non-compete clause; duty to pay compensation expires six months after receipt of declaration
Termination by mutual consent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Early termination of service on the Board of Management by mutual consent: remuneration of no more than the value of the claims arising in the remaining term of the contract; payments capped at the value of two years' annual remuneration including fringe benefits (severance payment cap); the severance payment cap is calculated exclusive of the value of any rights allocated from LTIPs; variable remuneration components paid out pursuant to the originally agreed conditions and at the originally agreed times; no early payout of variable remuneration components Early termination is instigated by the Board of Management member: no severance payment; annual bonus paid out pro rata in accordance with the level of target achievement at the end of the performance period Claims under the LTIP: see detailed description in remuneration system

Further details on the remuneration components and the other contractual terms and conditions can be found in the description of the remuneration system on the [company's website](#). Remuneration in the 2024 fiscal year was consistent with all the stipulations of the remuneration system.

DETAILS OF FIXED REMUNERATION

The base salaries of regular Board of Management members ranged from €889,167 to €1,005,795 in the 2024 fiscal year. The Chief Executive Officer received a base salary of €1,500,000. The Board of Management members received fringe benefits of between 1% and 6% of their base salary. The individual amounts are shown in the table titled **Total remuneration for the fiscal year**.

The Supervisory Board regularly reviews whether Board of Management remuneration is appropriate and in line with customary market standards with the support of an independent remuneration consultant, if necessary.

As is customary at DHL Group, the base salaries of Nikola Hagleitner and Pablo Ciano were adjusted starting from their third year of service on the Board of Management. From a low starting level compared with the DAX peer group, they were increased to €930,000. Maximum remuneration did not change, remaining at €5.15 million in both cases. The total target remuneration of all Board of Management members in 2024 remained below the median of the DAX 40 peer group.

The Board of Management members have been granted individually agreed-upon direct pension commitments. These were granted within the framework of a contribution-based system. The main elements of these commitments can be seen in the following table:

Aspect	Description
Type of retirement benefit	Capital payment with annuity option
Retirement age	62 years
Contribution amount	35% of base salary, limited to 15 years
Invalidity and survivor's pension	Payout of the pension account balance without any risk benefit
Interest rate	Pension contributions allocated up to and including 2020 in accordance with "iBoxx Corporates AA10+ Annual Yield," but at least 2.25% Pension contributions allocated as of 2021: weighted annual interest rate of overall pension assets of all German pension schemes of Deutsche Post, however no less than 1%
Annuity adjustment	1% annually

The service cost in accordance with IAS 19 arising in the 2024 fiscal year and the present values of the pension commitments calculated in accordance with IFRS as of the end of the 2024 fiscal year, together with the comparison figures for the previous year, are set out in the following table:

CONTRIBUTION-BASED PENSION COMMITMENTS: INDIVIDUAL BREAKDOWN


€	Service cost for 2023	Service cost for 2024	Present value (DBO) as of December 31, 2023	Present value (DBO) as of December 31, 2024
Dr. Tobias Meyer	322,088	521,103	1,872,508	2,518,994
Oscar de Bok	319,522	322,726	1,668,688	2,128,502
Pablo Ciano	298,999	299,004	447,664	787,960
Nikola Hagleitner	293,088	295,146	505,253	850,787
Melanie Kreis	343,151	346,360	3,729,736	4,379,908
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	323,322	340,584	2,111,723	2,596,879
John Pearson	320,989	322,681	1,593,072	2,029,198
Tim Scharwath	323,062	338,704	2,140,419	2,584,140
Total	2,544,221	2,786,308	14,069,063	17,876,368

Further details on the fixed remuneration can be found in the table **Remuneration components** and the description of the remuneration system on the **company's website**.

DETAILS OF VARIABLE REMUNERATION

The variable remuneration of the Board of Management members constitutes a major part of their total remuneration. It is composed of the annual bonus connected with a medium-term component and a long-term component. The variable remuneration is tied to the performance of the Board of Management. It creates incentives for the implementation of the corporate strategy and a value-creating and long-term development of the company in the interests of all stakeholders. The annual bonus – in combination with its medium-term component, which provides for a two-year sustainability phase with its own performance criterion – focuses on the annual targets derived from the company’s strategy and simultaneously ensures that these are sustainably pursued. The long-term component aims at a sustainable increase of the company’s value and directly links the interests of the Board of Management members with the long-term shareholder interest through its share price-based performance targets.

DURATION OF VARIABLE REMUNERATION COMPONENTS



Annual bonus


The annual bonus for 2024 is based on financial targets (70%) and nonfinancial ESG targets (30%). It has the following structure:

PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 2024

Performance criterion	Weighting	Incentive effect/strategic connection
Group EAC ¹	50%/60% ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key performance indicator for the company Adds a cost of capital component to EBIT to encourage the efficient use of resources and to ensure that the operating business is geared towards increasing value sustainably and generating increasing cash flow
Divisional EAC ¹	0%/10% ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measurement of individual performance in the respective Board departments Incentive for high profitability in the respective division
Free cash flow	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key performance indicator for the company Measure of how much cash the company generates, taking into account payments arising from the Group's operations as well as capital expenditure and lease and interest payments Indicator of how much cash is available to the company for paying dividends, for repaying debt or for other purposes (e.g. funding pension obligations)
E – Realized Decarbonization Effects	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Serves the implementation of the target of reducing CO₂ emissions and offering climate-friendly logistics services
S – Employee Engagement	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures progress in achieving the target of being Employer of Choice
G – Cybersecurity Rating	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures the success of cybersecurity management Serves to ensure trustworthy, transparent and legally compliant business practices

¹ Including the asset charge on goodwill and before goodwill impairment (EAC for short in the entire remuneration report).

² Group EAC is weighted at 50% for Board of Management members responsible for the divisions and the EAC of the respective division for which they are responsible at 10%. For the other members of the Board of Management, Group EAC is weighted at 60%.

CALCULATION OF THE ANNUAL BONUS 2024


1 Below a target achievement of 62.5%, the respective target is missed.
 2 No use was made of the option to increase/decrease.

In the spring of 2025, the Supervisory Board determined the achievement of the financial targets as follows:

2024 FINANCIAL TARGETS – TARGET ACHIEVEMENT

Target	Target amount €m	Actual amount €m	Target achievement %
Group EAC	2,353	2,207	88.38
Divisional EAC			
Post & Parcel Germany	57	40	0.00
Global Forwarding, Freight	507	362	0.00
Express	1,769	1,701	92.80
Supply Chain	379	436	125.00
eCommerce	41	54	125.00
Free cash flow Group	2,340	2,944	125.00

In accordance with the provisions of the remuneration system, the target agreements of the Board of Management members contained 30% ESG targets. The three sustainability categories were each weighted at 10%.

DHL Group performed the materiality analysis in line with the requirements of the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) on the basis of financial materiality and impact materiality. As part of this, impacts, risks and opportunities were first identified and evaluated by an internal panel of experts, and in-depth assessments were carried out. The results were then discussed with internal and external stakeholders. Based on this assessment, DHL Group classifies the ESRS topics of climate protection, own workforce, workers in the value chain and business conduct, as well as cybersecurity as an entity-specific topic, as material. These topics also form the basis for the direction of Strategy 2030. The Board of Management and the Supervisory Board reviewed and confirmed the strategic direction in the reporting year.

“E-target”: The business activities of DHL Group impact the environment mainly in the form of logistics-related greenhouse gases (GHG), which contribute to climate change. DHL Group aims to reduce the GHG emissions caused by these activities, as well as its dependency on fossil fuels, in order to mitigate the impact of its operations on the global climate.

By increasing efficiency and moving away from fossil fuels, DHL Group plans to substantially reduce GHG emissions by 2030 in line with limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius (Scopes 1 and 2) and well below 2 degrees Celsius (Scope 3). To this end, DHL Group has set itself the medium-term absolute target of reducing its logistics-related GHG emissions of 40 million metric tons of

CO₂e in the base year 2021 to below 29 million metric tons of CO₂e in 2030. It has set the following relative subtargets to achieve this: DHL Group aims to cut direct GHG emissions (Scopes 1 and 2) by 42% (proportion in 2021: 18.7%). Indirect GHG emissions (Scope 3) are to be cut by 25% (proportion in 2021: 81.3%) The following Scope 3 categories of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol are included: fuel- and energy-related activities (category 3), upstream transportation and distribution (category 4) and business travel (category 6). These targets were developed based on the requirements of the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) and support global efforts to limit global warming in accordance with the Paris Agreement of the United Nations. The targets were set in consultation with the Supervisory Board. Along with the accompanying measures, they are embedded in the Group-wide Environmental and Energy Policy. The interest rate of DHL Group's first sustainability-linked bond is also coupled with the two relevant subtargets.

DHL Group wants to reduce GHG emissions from logistics services (Scopes 1, 2 and 3) to net zero by 2050. This means that DHL Group aims to reduce these emissions (Scopes 1, 2 and 3) by 90% compared to the base year 2021 through active reduction measures. The 2050 target also includes GHG emissions from purchased goods and services (category 1) and from capital goods (category 2). Remaining, unavoidable emissions will then be fully compensated for with recognized countermeasures. The modeling of climate scenarios and Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) methodology were used for this target, too, and the target was validated by the SBTi in September 2024.

In order to achieve the strategic target of reducing emissions, the Board of Management was again measured by the KPI Realized Decarbonization Effects in 2024. DHL Group aimed to generate Realized Decarbonization Effects of 1.5 million metric tons of CO₂e in 2024 through targeted measures. The savings achieved in the reporting year amounted to 1,584 metric kilotons of CO₂e, resulting in target achievement of 122.70% for the corresponding Board of Management target.

“S-target”: With more than 600,000 employees around the globe, DHL Group is one the world's largest private sector employers. DHL Group aims to be Employer of Choice. It wants to recruit capable and committed people, nurture their continuing professional development and retain them long-term. Only motivated employees can deliver excellence in service quality, keep customers happy and safeguard the lasting success of DHL Group's business activities. Each year, DHL Group measures employee satisfaction and engagement by conducting a Group-wide survey. As part of the survey, all employees have the opportunity to anonymously rate the company's strategy and values as well as its working conditions. This important tool helps determine where DHL Group is in its journey toward becoming Employer of Choice. The company analyzes the annual survey to derive the Employee Engagement KPI, which represents the aggregated and weighted results of five statements by employees and also makes up 10% of the annual bonus of the Board of Management.

In 2024, 77% of employees took the opportunity to express their opinion and provide feedback. This is used as the foundation for creating the best possible working conditions, thus corresponding to the strategic goal of being Employer of Choice. The company intends to consistently maintain Employee Engagement at 80% or higher across the Group between now and 2030. With Employee Engagement at 82%, this target was achieved again in 2024. Target achievement in 2024 was 112.50%.

EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT KPI – DEVELOPMENT

Employee Engagement	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Approval (%)	82 ¹	84	83	83	82

1 Value adjusted due to a change to the questionnaire, not relevant for remuneration: 83.

“G-target”: DHL Group uses its cybersecurity management activities to protect the information of the Group, its business partners and its employees as well as IT systems from unauthorized access or manipulation and data misuse. This also enables uninterrupted availability and reliable operations. The internal guidelines and processes are based on the international standard ISO 27002, and our data centers are certified in accordance with ISO 27001.

Cybersecurity undergoes independent assessment by the external rating agency BitSight. This cybersecurity rating is based on the technical analysis of any weaknesses and points the company to any possible security risks on a daily basis through an automated service. Compared with a self-assessment, an external cybersecurity rating offers greater transparency and, thanks to its standardized nature, enables comparison with other companies. DHL Group compares its performance with the DAX 40 as well as with major customers and logistics firms not covered by this index. The target value is determined by the aspiration to be within the upper quarter of this comparison group. The rating amounted to 750 of 820 achievable points as of the end of the year. The target for the year under review was thus exceeded.

2024 NONFINANCIAL TARGETS – TARGET ACHIEVEMENT

Target	Target content	Target amount	Actual amount	Target achievement %
E – Environment	Measures for absolute CO ₂ reduction in the Group – Realized Decarbonization Effects	1,515 ¹	1,584	122.70
S – Social	Employee Opinion Survey (EOS) – Employee Engagement at Group level	80 ²	82	112.50
G – Governance	Cybersecurity rating	690 ³	750	125.00

1 kt CO₂e WtW

2 Approval (%)

3 Points

The following table sets out the target achievement determined by the Supervisory Board in the spring of 2025 for the annual bonus for the 2024 fiscal year:

TOTAL TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR ANNUAL BONUS IN THE 2024 FISCAL YEAR (%)

Board of Management member	Target achievement Group EAC	Target achievement Divisional EAC	Target achievement Free cash flow	Target achievement Environment	Target achievement Social	Target achievement Governance	Weighted total target achievement
Dr. Tobias Meyer	88.38	n. a.	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	101.55
Oscar de Bok	88.38	125.00	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	105.21
Pablo Ciano	88.38	125.00	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	105.21
Nikola Hagleitner	88.38	0.00	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	92.71
Melanie Kreis	88.38	n. a.	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	101.55
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	88.38	n. a.	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	101.55
John Pearson	88.38	92.80	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	101.99
Tim Scharwath	88.38	0.00	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	92.71

One half of the annual bonus, which is determined on the basis of target achievement, will be paid out in the spring of 2025 following the adoption of the consolidated financial statements for the 2024 fiscal year. The other half will be deferred and forms a medium-term component. It is not paid out until after the two-year sustainability phase has expired, i.e. after the consolidated financial statements for the 2026 fiscal year have been adopted in the spring of 2027, but only if, in addition, the EAC sustainability criterion has been achieved during that period. The amounts paid out on the basis of total target achievement as shown above for the 2024 fiscal year can be seen in the table titled **Total remuneration for the fiscal year**.

Adjustment due to exceptional developments

In the year under review, DHL Group sadly recorded four fatal accidents involving its own employees. This was seven fewer than in the previous year. There was one fatal accident involving an external employee subject to instruction (number unchanged from previous year) and six fatal accidents involving contractual partners on business premises operated by DHL.

The Personnel Committee of the Supervisory Board has examined these accidents in detail and is convinced that the Board of Management has put in place a structured, comprehensive and global management process at DHL Group to avoid such accidents. The process requires the CEO to be informed immediately in the event of a fatal accident. A detailed analysis of the causes is conducted for every fatality. If risks can be reduced through specific measures, these measures are determined firstly for the affected unit. Each individual incident and the resulting measures are then presented and discussed at Group level in the responsible committees. This aims to ensure that the measures taken are also applied by other units within the Group where similar dangers exist.

The process serves to continuously analyze risks and reduce them as far as possible. The success of this holistic approach is also evident in the LTIFR (lost time injury frequency rate; the number of accidents resulting in absence per million hours worked), which has seen a sustained decline in recent years from 21.9 in 2017 to 14.5 in 2024. However, DHL Group has only limited control of risks resulting from road traffic. The safety measures taken make an important contribution to preventing road accidents but unfortunately cannot eliminate them entirely.

The Personnel Committee has reported its findings to the Supervisory Board. Given the structured process, and the extensive accident prevention measures following from this, the Supervisory Board sees no reason, for fiscal year 2024, to adjust the amount of the annual bonus resulting from target achievement due to exceptional developments. The Supervisory Board will continue to be informed of the accident rate in the future and reserves the right to factor such accidents into the determination of the variable remuneration should developments require.

Medium-term component (2022 deferral)

The sustainability phase of the share of the annual bonus deferred in 2022 expired December 31, 2024. The requirement for payout was that EAC at the end of the sustainability phase exceed EAC for the base year or that cumulative EAC be positive during the sustainability phase, i.e. that the asset charge had been earned. The latter was the case.

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR 2022 MEDIUM-TERM COMPONENT

2022	2023	2024	Spring 2025
Annual bonus	Deferral		Determination of target achievement/payout
	CRITERION 1¹: EAC 2024 > EAC 2022		2,207 < 5,117 ²
	or CRITERION 2¹: EAC 2023 + 2024 > 0		2,860 + 2,207 > 0

1 EAC (€m).

2 EAC 2022 adjusted, see the 2023 Annual Report, note 4 to the consolidated financial statements.

The medium-term component for 2022 is paid out to the Board of Management members in the spring of 2025 following the adoption of the consolidated financial statements for the 2024 fiscal year. The individual payout amounts are shown in the table titled **Total remuneration for the fiscal year**.

Long-term component (Long-Term Incentive Plan, LTIP)

The long-term component – which is granted annually in the form of stock appreciation rights (SAR) in the value of an individual base salary – provides an incentive for the company’s long-term and sustainable development. The six performance targets are tied to the share price. They are linked partly to the absolute performance of Deutsche Post shares and partly to their performance relative to the STOXX Europe 600 index. When one of the performance targets is fulfilled, 1/6 of the originally granted SARs becomes exercisable.

If, at the end of the four-year lock-up period, only the targets for share price performance relative to the STOXX Europe 600 have been reached, the share price has additionally to rise over the issue price; otherwise no payout is made.


Details on the structure of the long-term component can be found in the table **overview of the remuneration components** and the description of the remuneration system on the **company’s website**.

Long-term component (LTIP), 2020 tranche

The lock-up period for the 2020 LTIP tranche granted four years previously at an issue price of €37.83 ended on August 31, 2024. The absolute performance of the Deutsche Post share compared with the baseline amounted to 2.34%, and the relative performance compared to the STOXX Europe 600 index was -36.97%. This meant that all performance targets were missed. Due to the missed targets, none of the SARs granted in the 2020 fiscal year have become exercisable. The 2020 tranche has lapsed without replacement or compensation, meaning it will never give rise to any payments.

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE 2020 SAR TRANCHE

SAR performance targets	Thresholds	Target achievement
Performance versus STOXX Europe 600	+10%	✘
	+0%	✘
Absolute increase in share price	+25%	✘
	+20%	✘
	+15%	✘
	+10%	✘

ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE OF THE DEUTSCHE POST SHARE AND PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO THE STOXX EUROPE 600


1 Issue price (average price of the Deutsche Post share during the 20 trading days preceding the issue date).
 2 Start value of the STOXX Europe 600 (average value during the 20 trading days preceding the issue date).
 3 Average share price and index value of the last 60 trading days before the end of the lock-up period.

Long-term component (LTIP), 2024 tranche

On September 1, 2024, the members of the Board of Management were again granted SARs as the 2024 tranche. The Board of Management members each received a number of SARs equal in value to their individual base salary on the grant date. The total value of the SARs granted came to €8.18 million in the 2024 fiscal year (previous year: €8.04 million). The value of one SAR as of the grant date was computed by the company actuary and amounted to €8.44. The number of SARs granted to the individual Board of Management members in 2024 can be seen in the table titled **Total SAR holdings as of December 31, 2024** and the value of the SARs granted in the table titled **Target remuneration**.

PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR THE 2024 SAR TRANCHE

SAR performance targets	Thresholds	Target achievement
Performance versus STOXX Europe 600	+10%	559.63 points
	+0%	508.75 points
Absolute increase in share price	+25%	€46.92
	+20%	€45.04
	+15%	€43.16
	+10%	€41.29

The index stood at 508.75 points as of the grant date. The issue price was €37.53. Payments under the 2024 tranche will be made no earlier than September 1, 2028, provided that at least one of the total of six performance targets are met. If no performance target is met, the SARs lapse without replacement, which means that they will never give rise to any payments.

Overview of long-term component (LTIP)

The following section summarizes the basic information on each of the tranches under the long-term component whose lock-up periods or exercise periods had not yet expired in the 2024 fiscal year:

GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE LTIP TRANCHES 2018–2024

SAR tranche	Date of grant	Issue price (exercise price) €	Start value of the index	End of the lockup period	End of the exercise period
2018	September 1, 2018	31.08	385.02	August 31, 2022	August 31, 2024
2019	September 1, 2019	28.88	371.81	August 31, 2023	August 31, 2025
2020	September 1, 2020	37.83	368.10	August 31, 2024	Not applicable, tranche lapsed
2021	September 1, 2021	58.68	471.78	August 31, 2025	August 31, 2027
2022	September 1, 2022	39.06	434.34	August 31, 2026	August 31, 2028
2023	September 1, 2023	43.26	456.06	August 31, 2027	August 31, 2029
2024	September 1, 2024	37.53	508.75	August 31, 2028	August 31, 2030

TOTAL SAR HOLDINGS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2024

	SARs granted in the fiscal year	Total holdings of SARs subject to lock-up period ¹		Total holdings of exercisable SARs ²	
	2024	Number as at December 31, 2024	Value ³ as at December 31, 2024 (€)	Number as at December 31, 2024	Value ³ as at December 31, 2024 (€)
Dr. Tobias Meyer	177,726	536,706	167,411	99,010	521,783
Oscar de Bok	110,190	387,258	136,674	0	0
Pablo Ciano	110,190	306,174	133,508	0	0
Nikola Hagleitner	110,190	306,174	133,508	0	0
Melanie Kreis	119,172	445,674	151,627	0	0
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	115,704	428,556	145,727	58,824	310,002
John Pearson	110,190	411,066	142,432	28,010	147,613
Tim Scharwath	115,704	428,556	145,727	100,000	527,000

1 SARs already granted whose lock-up period had not yet expired at the end of the fiscal year in question. Whether and, if so, how many of these SARs become exercisable depends on the achievement of the six share-price based performance targets per tranche.

2 SARs, the lock-up period for which had already expired at the end of the fiscal year in question and which can be exercised up until the expiry of the applicable exercise period. The amount of the specific proceeds depends on how they are exercised and, in addition, is subject to the prior applicability of the agreed caps.

3 Value of provisions as at December 31, 2024

The individual payout amounts arising from the exercise of SARs in the 2024 fiscal year are shown in the table titled **Total remuneration for the fiscal year**.

APPLICATION OF MALUS AND CLAWBACK PROVISIONS

In the 2024 fiscal year, the Supervisory Board had no reason to make use of its right to withhold or reclaim variable remuneration components.

LOANS

The company did not extend any loans to Board of Management members.

TARGET REMUNERATION OF THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT IN THE 2024 FISCAL YEAR

The following table titled Target remuneration shows, in addition to the base salary and fringe benefits, the target amount for the annual bonus (including deferral) for the 2024 fiscal year in the event of 100% target achievement; the long-term component is shown at the fair value as of the date of grant. With respect to pension commitments, the pension expense, i.e., the service cost in accordance with IAS 19 (Service Cost), is presented. The table also shows the minimum and maximum values that can be achieved as well as the comparison figures for the previous year.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Dr. Tobias Meyer Chief Executive Officer (since May 5, 2023)					
	2023¹	Min. 2023	Max. 2023	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024
Base salary	1,310,000	1,310,000	1,310,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000
Fringe benefits	31,370	31,370	31,370	33,332	33,332	33,332
Total	1,341,370	1,341,370	1,341,370	1,533,332	1,533,332	1,533,332
Annual bonus: one-year share	524,000	0	655,000 ²	600,000	0	750,000 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	2,024,047	0	4,405,000	2,100,007	0	4,500,000
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	1,500,047	0	3,750,000	1,500,007	0	3,750,000
Annual bonus: deferral with three-year term	524,000	0	655,000 ²	600,000	0	750,000 ²
Total	3,889,417	1,341,370	6,401,370	4,233,339	1,533,332	6,783,332
Pension expense (service cost)	322,088	322,088	322,088	521,103	521,103	521,103
Total remuneration	4,211,505	1,663,458	6,723,458	4,754,442	2,054,435	7,304,435
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			n. a.³			n. a.³

1 Upon his appointment to the position of CEO, the base salary of Tobias Meyer was increased to €1,500,000 per year and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system. Starting from May 1, 2026, Tobias Meyer will receive a base salary of €1,750,000. This second salary adjustment was also already agreed as part of his appointment as CEO in order to move his remuneration toward a level commensurate with his duties and responsibilities. Even after the salary adjustments and the introduction of the revised remuneration system from 2026, his target remuneration will remain below the market level and significantly below the company-specific positioning in the DAX40 peer group (analysis based on currently available 2024 remuneration data for the DAX40).

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

3 The target remuneration cap cannot be mathematically reached.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Oscar de Bok Supply Chain					
	2023	Min. 2023	Max. 2023	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024
Base salary	930,000	930,000	930,000	930,000	930,000	930,000
Fringe benefits	18,628	18,628	18,628	20,271	20,271	20,271
Total	948,628	948,628	948,628	950,271	950,271	950,271
Annual bonus: one-year share	372,000	0	465,000 ¹	372,000	0	465,000 ¹
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,302,047	0	4,185,000	1,302,004	0	4,185,000
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	930,047	0	3,720,000	930,004	0	3,720,000
Annual bonus: deferral with three-year term	372,000	0	465,000 ¹	372,000	0	465,000 ¹
Total	2,622,675	948,628	5,598,628	2,624,275	950,271	5,600,271
Pension expense (service cost)	319,522	319,522	319,522	322,726	322,726	322,726
Total remuneration	2,942,197	1,268,150	5,918,150	2,947,001	1,272,997	5,922,997
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Pablo Ciano eCommerce					
	2023	Min. 2023	Max. 2023	2024¹	Min. 2024	Max. 2024
Base salary	860,000	860,000	860,000	889,167	889,167	889,167
Fringe benefits	60,843	60,843	60,843	34,882	34,882	34,882
Total	920,843	920,843	920,843	924,049	924,049	924,049
Annual bonus: one-year share	344,000	0	430,000 ²	355,667	0	444,584 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,204,003	0	3,870,000	1,285,671	0	4,164,584
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	860,003	0	3,440,000	930,004	0	3,720,000
Annual bonus: deferral with three-year term	344,000	0	430,000 ²	355,667	0	444,584 ²
Total	2,468,846	920,843	5,220,843	2,565,387	924,049	5,533,217
Pension expense (service cost)	298,999	298,999	298,999	299,004	299,004	299,004
Total remuneration	2,767,845	1,219,842	5,519,842	2,864,391	1,223,053	5,832,221
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 From a low starting level in comparison with the market, the base salary of Pablo Ciano was increased to €930,000 per year starting with the third year of service on the Board of Management from August 1, 2024, and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system, cf. [details of fixed remuneration](#).

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Nikola Hagleitner Post & Parcel Germany					
	2023	Min. 2023	Max. 2023	2024¹	Min. 2024	Max. 2024
Base salary	860,000	860,000	860,000	895,000	895,000	895,000
Fringe benefits	16,935	16,935	16,935	19,207	19,207	19,207
Total	876,935	876,935	876,935	914,207	914,207	914,207
Annual bonus: one-year share	344,000	0	430,000 ²	358,000	0	447,500 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,204,003	0	3,870,000	1,288,004	0	4,167,500
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	860,003	0	3,440,000	930,004	0	3,720,000
Annual bonus: deferral with three-year term	344,000	0	430,000 ²	358,000	0	447,500 ²
Total	2,424,938	876,935	5,176,935	2,560,211	914,207	5,529,207
Pension expense (service cost)	293,088	293,088	293,088	295,146	295,146	295,146
Total remuneration	2,718,026	1,170,023	5,470,023	2,855,357	1,209,353	5,824,353
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 From a low starting level in comparison with the market, the base salary of Nikola Hagleitner was increased to €930,000 per year starting with the third year of service on the Board of Management from July 1, 2024, and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system, cf. [details of fixed remuneration](#).

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Melanie Kreis Finance					
	2023	Min. 2023	Max. 2023	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024
Base salary	1,005,795	1,005,795	1,005,795	1,005,795	1,005,795	1,005,795
Fringe benefits	18,338	18,338	18,338	18,552	18,552	18,552
Total	1,024,133	1,024,133	1,024,133	1,024,347	1,024,347	1,024,347
Annual bonus: one-year share	402,318	0	502,898 ¹	402,318	0	502,898 ¹
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,408,118	0	4,526,078	1,408,130	0	4,526,078
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	1,005,800	0	4,023,180	1,005,812	0	4,023,180
Annual bonus: deferral with three-year term	402,318	0	502,898 ¹	402,318	0	502,898 ¹
Total	2,834,569	1,024,133	6,053,109	2,834,795	1,024,347	6,053,323
Pension expense (service cost)	343,151	343,151	343,151	346,360	346,360	346,360
Total remuneration	3,177,720	1,367,284	6,396,260	3,181,155	1,370,707	6,399,683
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Dr. Thomas Ogilvie HR					
	2023¹	Min. 2023	Max. 2023	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024
Base salary	945,500	945,500	945,500	976,500	976,500	976,500
Fringe benefits	12,745	12,745	12,745	10,566	10,566	10,566
Total	958,245	958,245	958,245	987,066	987,066	987,066
Annual bonus: one-year share	378,200	0	472,750 ²	390,600	0	488,250 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,354,746	0	4,378,750	1,367,142	0	4,394,250
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	976,546	0	3,906,000	976,542	0	3,906,000
Annual bonus: deferral with three-year term	378,200	0	472,750 ²	390,600	0	488,250 ²
Total	2,691,191	958,245	5,809,745	2,744,808	987,066	5,869,566
Pension expense (service cost)	323,322	323,322	323,322	340,584	340,584	340,584
Total remuneration	3,014,513	1,281,567	6,133,067	3,085,392	1,327,650	6,210,150
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 In conjunction with the regular salary review, the base salary of Thomas Ogilvie was increased to €976,500 per year starting from September 1, 2023, and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system.

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	John Pearson Express					
	2023	Min. 2023	Max. 2023	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024
Base salary	930,000	930,000	930,000	930,000	930,000	930,000
Fringe benefits	66,450	66,450	66,450	58,810	58,810	58,810
Total	996,450	996,450	996,450	988,810	988,810	988,810
Annual bonus: one-year share	372,000	0	465,000 ¹	372,000	0	465,000 ¹
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,302,047	0	4,185,000	1,302,004	0	4,185,000
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	930,047	0	3,720,000	930,004	0	3,720,000
Annual bonus: deferral with three-year term	372,000	0	465,000 ¹	372,000	0	465,000 ¹
Total	2,670,497	996,450	5,646,450	2,662,814	988,810	5,638,810
Pension expense (service cost)	320,989	320,989	320,989	322,681	322,681	322,681
Total remuneration	2,991,486	1,317,439	5,967,439	2,985,495	1,311,491	5,961,491
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Tim Scharwath Global Forwarding, Freight					
	2023¹	Min. 2023	Max. 2023	2024¹	Min. 2024	Max. 2024
Base salary	957,125	957,125	957,125	976,500	976,500	976,500
Fringe benefits	15,998	15,998	15,998	14,757	14,757	14,757
Total	973,123	973,123	973,123	991,257	991,257	991,257
Annual bonus: one-year share	382,850	0	478,563 ²	390,600	0	488,250 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,359,396	0	4,384,563	1,367,142	0	4,394,250
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	976,546	0	3,906,000	976,542	0	3,906,000
Annual bonus: deferral with three-year term	382,850	0	478,563 ²	390,600	0	488,250 ²
Total	2,715,369	973,123	5,836,249	2,748,999	991,257	5,873,757
Pension expense (service cost)	323,062	323,062	323,062	338,704	338,704	338,704
Total remuneration	3,038,431	1,296,185	6,159,311	3,087,703	1,329,961	6,212,461
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 In conjunction with the regular salary review, the base salary of Tim Scharwath was increased to €976,500 per year starting from June 1, 2023, and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system.

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TOTAL REMUNERATION FOR THE 2024 FISCAL YEAR

In addition to the base salary and fringe benefits, the following table includes the amount for the one-year share of the annual bonus based on the achievement of the targets set for 2024 (2024 annual bonus). With regard to the medium-term component (deferral), the payout amount reported is that of the deferral whose calculation period ended upon expiry of the fiscal year. In the 2024 fiscal year this was the 2022 deferral. The 2024 annual bonus and the 2022 deferral will be paid to the Board of Management members in the spring of 2025 following the adoption of the consolidated financial statements for the 2024 fiscal year. The tables also provide an indication of the amount paid under the tranches of the long-term component that were exercised in the 2024 fiscal year. Furthermore, for reasons of transparency, the pension expense (service cost according to IAS 19) is also disclosed. Comparison figures for the previous year are stated in all cases.

Board of Management members' remuneration fell significantly year on year in some cases. This was largely due to the relevant Board of Management members not exercising any SARs in 2024 or to the proceeds being lower.

TOTAL REMUNERATION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR

	Dr. Tobias Meyer Chief Executive Officer (since May 5, 2023)		Oscar de Bok Supply Chain		Pablo Ciano eCommerce	
	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024
Base salary	1,310,000	1,500,000	930,000	930,000	860,000	889,167
Fringe benefits	31,370	33,332	18,628	20,271	60,843	34,882
Total	1,341,370	1,533,332	948,628	950,271	920,843	924,049
Annual bonus: one-year share	487,669	609,271	364,138	391,372	293,730	374,188
Multi-year variable remuneration	2,358,327	427,754	366,704	430,799	–	168,487
Annual bonus: 2021 deferral	406,727	–	366,704	–	–	–
Annual bonus: 2022 deferral	–	427,754	–	430,799	–	168,487
2018 LTIP tranche	–	–	–	–	–	–
2019 LTIP tranche	1,951,600	–	–	–	–	–
Other	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total	4,187,366	2,570,357	1,679,470	1,772,442	1,214,573	1,466,724
Pension expense (service cost)	322,088	521,103	319,522	322,726	298,999	299,004
Total	4,509,454	3,091,460	1,998,992	2,095,168	1,513,572	1,765,728

TOTAL REMUNERATION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR

	Nikola Hagleitner Post & Parcel Germany		Melanie Kreis Finance		Dr. Thomas Ogilvie HR	
	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024
Base salary	860,000	895,000	1,005,795	1,005,795	945,500	976,500
Fringe benefits	16,935	19,207	18,338	18,552	12,745	10,566
Total	876,935	914,207	1,024,133	1,024,347	958,245	987,066
Annual bonus: one-year share	293,730	331,893	218,037 ¹	408,535	351,978	396,636
Multi-year variable remuneration	–	190,615	3,564,679	1,749,061	3,175,163	940,893
Annual bonus: 2021 deferral	–	–	476,044	–	456,863	–
Annual bonus: 2022 deferral	–	190,615	–	484,108	–	458,761
2018 LTIP tranche	–	–	–	1,264,953	–	482,132
2019 LTIP tranche	–	–	3,088,635	–	2,718,300	–
Other	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total	1,170,665	1,436,715	4,806,849	3,181,943	4,485,386	2,324,595
Pension expense (service cost)	293,088	295,146	343,151	346,360	323,322	340,584
Total	1,463,753	1,731,861	5,150,000	3,528,303	4,808,708	2,665,179

1 The one-year share of Ms. Kreis's annual bonus was curtailed by €156,387 due to the payment cap for 2023.

TOTAL REMUNERATION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR

	John Pearson Express		Tim Scharwath Global Forwarding, Freight	
	2023	2024	2023	2024
Base salary	930,000	930,000	957,125	976,500
Fringe benefits	66,450	58,810	15,998	14,757
Total	996,450	988,810	973,123	991,257
Annual bonus: one-year share	349,417	379,393	367,203	362,116
Multi-year variable remuneration	3,432,115	442,011	3,072,631	979,465
Annual bonus: 2021 deferral	424,625	–	459,188	–
Annual bonus: 2022 deferral	–	442,011	–	458,761
2018 LTIP tranche	–	–	–	520,704
2019 LTIP tranche	3,007,490	–	2,613,443	–
Other	–	–	–	–
Total	4,777,982	1,810,214	4,412,957	2,332,838
Pension expense (service cost)	320,989	322,681	323,062	338,704
Total	5,098,971	2,132,895	4,736,019	2,671,542

REMUNERATION AWARDED AND DUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1), SENTENCE 2, OF THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT (AKTIENGESETZ – AKTG)

The remuneration of the Board of Management in the 2024 fiscal year was consistent with all the stipulations of the remuneration system.

In accordance with the requirements of Section 162 AktG, disclosure of the remuneration awarded and due includes all payments received as well as all payments not received but due in the fiscal year. Accordingly, the table titled **Remuneration awarded and due in accordance with Section 162 (1), Sentence 2, German Stock Corporation Act in the 2024 fiscal year** includes – in addition to base salary and fringe benefits – payments for the 2023 annual bonus paid in the spring of 2024. For the medium-term component, the amount paid from the 2021 deferral in 2024 is shown. The table also states the amount paid under the tranches of the long-term component that were exercised in the 2024 fiscal year.

In accordance with the regulatory requirements, the target achievement underlying the 2023 annual bonus paid in 2024, the 2021 deferral and the 2018 LTIP tranche is described below in greater detail.

2023 annual bonus – target achievement

The 2023 annual bonus is based on the remuneration system in the form approved at the Annual General Meeting of May 6, 2021 (agenda item 10). It can be accessed on the **company's website**. The Board of Management members received an annual bonus whose individual amount reflected the extent to which their predefined targets were achieved, missed or exceeded.

It had the following structure for 2023:

PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 2023


Performance criterion	Weighting	Incentive effect/strategic connection
Group EAC ¹	50%/60% ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key performance indicator for the company Adds a cost of capital component to EBIT to encourage the efficient use of resources and to ensure that the operating business is geared towards increasing value sustainably and generating increasing cash flow
Divisional EAC ¹	0%/10% ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measurement of individual performance in the respective Board departments Incentive for high profitability in the respective division
Free cash flow	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key performance indicator for the company Measure of how much cash the company generates, taking into account payments arising from the Group's operations as well as capital expenditure and lease and interest payments Indicator of how much cash is available to the company for paying dividends, for repaying debt or for other purposes (e.g. funding pension obligations)
E – Realized Decarbonization Effects	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Serves the implementation of the target of reducing CO₂ emissions and offering climate-friendly logistics services
S – Employee Engagement	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures progress in achieving the target of being Employer of Choice
G – Cybersecurity Rating	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures the success of cybersecurity management Serves to ensure trustworthy, transparent and legally compliant business practices

1 Including the asset charge on goodwill and before goodwill impairment.

2 Group EAC is weighted at 50% for Board of Management members responsible for the divisions and the EAC of the respective division for which they are responsible at 10%. For the other members of the Board of Management, Group EAC is weighted at 60%.

The individual annual bonus amount for 2023 was calculated as follows:

CALCULATION OF THE ANNUAL BONUS 2023



1 Below a target achievement of 62.5%, the respective target is missed.

2 No use was made of the option to increase/decrease.

In the spring of 2024, the Supervisory Board determined the achievement of the financial targets as follows:

2023 FINANCIAL TARGETS – TARGET ACHIEVEMENT

Target	Target amount €m	Actual amount €m	Target achievement %
Group EAC	3,264	2,860	76.80
Divisional EAC			
Post & Parcel Germany	409	126	0.00
Global Forwarding, Freight	757	765	105.26
Express	2,021	1,864	85.43
Supply Chain	300	357	125.00
eCommerce	186	122	0.00
Free cash flow Group	2,248	2,942	125.00

The ESG targets were achieved as follows:

2023 NONFINANCIAL TARGETS – TARGET ACHIEVEMENT

Target	Target content	Target amount	Actual amount	Target achievement %
E – Environment	Measures for absolute CO ₂ reduction in the Group – Realized Decarbonization Effects	1,332 ¹	1,335	101.12
S – Social	Employee Opinion Survey (EOS) – Employee Engagement at Group level	80 ²	83	118.75
G – Governance	Cybersecurity rating	690 ³	750	125.00

1 kt CO₂e WtW

2 Approval (%)

3 Points

The following table sets out the overall target achievement determined by the Supervisory Board in the spring of 2024 for the annual bonus for the 2023 fiscal year:

TOTAL TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR ANNUAL BONUS IN THE 2023 FISCAL YEAR (%)

Board of Management member	Target achievement Group EAC	Target achievement Divisional EAC	Target achievement Free cash flow	Target achievement Environment	Target achievement Social	Target achievement Governance	Weighted total target achievement
Dr. Tobias Meyer (CEO since May 5, 2023)	76.80	n.a.	125.00	101.12	118.75	125.00	93.07
Oscar de Bok	76.80	125.00	125.00	101.12	118.75	125.00	97.89
Pablo Ciano	76.80	0.00	125.00	101.12	118.75	125.00	85.39
Nikola Hagleitner	76.80	0.00	125.00	101.12	118.75	125.00	85.39
Melanie Kreis	76.80	n.a.	125.00	101.12	118.75	125.00	93.07
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	76.80	n.a.	125.00	101.12	118.75	125.00	93.07
John Pearson	76.80	85.43	125.00	101.12	118.75	125.00	93.93
Tim Scharwath	76.80	105.26	125.00	101.12	118.75	125.00	95.91

One half of the annual bonus determined on the basis of target achievement was paid out in the spring of 2024 following the adoption of the consolidated financial statements for the 2023 fiscal year. The other half was transferred to the medium-term component. It will be paid out after the consolidated financial statements for the 2025 fiscal year have been adopted in the spring of 2026, but only if the EAC sustainability criterion has been achieved during that period.

2021 deferral

The sustainability phase of the share of the annual bonus deferred in 2021 expired December 31, 2023. The requirement for payout was that EAC at the end of the sustainability phase exceed EAC for the base year or that cumulative EAC be positive during the sustainability phase, i. e. that the asset charge had been earned. The latter was the case.

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR 2021 MEDIUM-TERM COMPONENT

2021	2022	2023	Spring 2024
Annual bonus	Deferral		Determination of target achievement
	CRITERION 1 ¹ : EAC 2023 > EAC 2021		2,860 < 5,186 ✘
	or		
	CRITERION 2 ² : EAC 2022 + 2023 > 0		5,117 ² + 2,860 > 0 ✔

1 EAC (€m).

2 EAC 2022 adjusted, see the 2023 Annual Report, note 4 to the consolidated financial statements. The adjustment has no effect on target achievement for 2022 and 2023.

The deferred amounts were paid out in the spring of 2024 following the adoption of the consolidated financial statements for the 2023 fiscal year.

Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP), 2018 tranche


In the fiscal year, the Board of Management members exercised SARs under the tranche granted in 2018 under the Long-Term Incentive Plan. The Long Term Incentive Plan was approved as part of the remuneration system for the Board of Management at the Annual General Meetings on April 28, 2010, April 24, 2018 and May 6, 2021.

The performance targets for the SAR tranche granted in 2018, from which payouts were made in 2024, were achieved as follows:

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE SAR TRANCHE

SAR performance targets	Thresholds	2018
Performance versus STOXX Europe 600	+10%	✘
	+0%	✔
Absolute increase in share price	+25%	✘
	+20%	✘
	+15%	✔
	+10%	✔

Half of the six performance targets were therefore achieved.

DETAILS ON ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE OF THE SAR TRANCHES 2018


1 Issue price (average price of the Deutsche Post share during the 20 days preceding the issue date).

2 Start value of the index (average value during the 20 days preceding the issue date).

3 Average share price and index value of the last 60 trading days before the end of the lock-up period.

The following table provides an overview of the remuneration awarded and due in the 2024 fiscal year:

REMUNERATION AWARDED AND DUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1), SENTENCE 2, GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT IN THE 2024 FISCAL YEAR

€	Dr. Tobias Meyer Chief Executive Officer		Oscar de Bok Supply Chain		Pablo Ciano eCommerce	
Base salary	1,500,000	61.8%	930,000	55.3%	889,167	73.0%
Fringe benefits	33,332	1.4%	20,271	1.2%	34,882	2.9%
Total fixed remuneration components	1,533,332	63.2%	950,271	56.5%	924,049	75.9%
Annual bonus: one-year share	487,669	20.1%	364,138	21.7%	293,730	24.1%
Multi-year variable remuneration	406,727	16.8%	366,704	21.8%	–	–
Annual bonus: 2021 deferral	406,727	16.8%	366,704	21.8%	–	–
2018 LTIP tranche	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total variable remuneration components	894,396	36.8%	730,842	43.5%	293,730	24.1%
Other	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total remuneration	2,427,728	100.0%	1,681,113	100.0%	1,217,779	100.0%

REMUNERATION AWARDED AND DUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1), SENTENCE 2, GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT IN THE 2024 FISCAL YEAR

€	Nikola Hagleitner Post & Parcel Germany		Melanie Kreis Finance		Dr. Thomas Ogilvie HR	
Base salary	895,000	74.1%	1,005,795	33.7%	976,500	42.9%
Fringe benefits	19,207	1.6%	18,552	0.6%	10,566	0.5%
Total fixed remuneration components	914,207	75.7%	1,024,347	34.3%	987,066	43.3%
Annual bonus: one-year share	293,730	24.3%	218,037	7.3%	351,978	15.5%
Multi-year variable remuneration	–	–	1,740,997	58.4%	938,995	41.2%
Annual bonus: 2021 deferral	–	–	476,044	16.0%	456,863	20.1%
2018 LTIP tranche	–	–	1,264,953	42.4%	482,132	21.2%
Total variable remuneration components	293,730	24.3%	1,959,034	65.7%	1,290,973	56.7%
Other	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total remuneration	1,207,937	100.0%	2,983,381	100.0%	2,278,039	100.0%

REMUNERATION AWARDED AND DUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1), SENTENCE 2, GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT IN THE 2024 FISCAL YEAR

€	John Pearson Express		Tim Scharwath Global Forwarding, Freight	
Base salary	930,000	52.8%	976,500	41.8%
Fringe benefits	58,810	3.3%	14,757	0.6%
Total fixed remuneration components	988,810	56.1%	991,257	42.4%
Annual bonus: one-year share	349,417	19.8%	367,203	15.7%
Multi-year variable remuneration	424,625	24.1%	979,892	41.9%
Annual bonus: 2021 deferral	424,625	24.1%	459,188	19.6%
2018 LTIP tranche	–	–	520,704	22.3%
Total variable remuneration components	774,042	43.9%	1,347,095	57.6%
Other	–	–	–	–
Total remuneration	1,762,852	100.0%	2,338,352	100.0%

OBSERVANCE OF REMUNERATION CAPS

The currently applicable remuneration caps were observed.

The remuneration system applicable in the 2024 fiscal year, which was approved at the Annual General Meeting on May 6, 2021, provides for an overall cap on the amount of payouts (including the service cost for the company pension scheme attributable to the fiscal year). Firstly, this limits the maximum payment amount arising from target remuneration in a given fiscal year (target remuneration cap; cap on remuneration granted according to the terminology of the Code dated February 7, 2017). Compliance with the maximum remuneration, i.e. the cap on remuneration granted, cannot be reported on until the final remuneration component from the 2021 fiscal year has been paid out. This depends on the target achievement of the 2021 LTIP tranche and the time when individual Board of Management members exercise their rights during the two-year exercise period from 2025 to 2027.

Payments attributable to a given fiscal year are also limited by a maximum amount (payment cap, the term used in the 2017 Code).

The cap on remuneration granted stands at €5.15 million for regular Board of Management members and €8.15 million for the CEO and has applied in this form since 2021. The payment cap also stands at €5.15 million and €8.15 million, respectively, and has applied since the 2022 fiscal year.

The remuneration components are included in the calculation of the caps as follows:

OVERALL CAPS: REMUNERATION COMPONENTS INCLUDED (EXAMPLE)

Cap on remuneration granted for 2024	Payment cap for 2024
Remuneration components included <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-Term Incentive Plan 2024 tranche • Deferral from 2024 annual bonus • Proportion of 2024 annual bonus for immediate payout • Fringe benefits 2024 • Base salary 2024 • Pension expense (service cost ¹) 2024 	Remuneration components included <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-Term Incentive Plan 2018/2019/2020 tranches ² • Deferral from 2022 annual bonus • Proportion of 2024 annual bonus for immediate payout • Fringe benefits 2024 • Base salary 2024 • Pension expense (service cost ¹) 2024

1 In case of payout of a pension substitute: amount of pension substitute.

2 The payment date depends on the date of exercise within the two-year exercise period.

In addition to the aforementioned overall caps, the remuneration system has for many years also provided for caps for individual variable remuneration components.

Due to the cap regulations that existed before Section 87a (1), Sentence 2, No. 1 AktG took effect, a payment to the former Board of Management member Frank Appel in the 2024 fiscal year was curtailed by applying the target remuneration cap.

Remuneration of former Board of Management members in accordance with Section 162 (1), Sentence 2, of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz – AktG)

The benefits paid to former Board of Management members who have left the company over the past ten years can be seen in the following table:

REMUNERATION IN 2024 – FORMER BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS

€	Ken Allen		Frank Appel	
Fixed remuneration				
Base salary	–	–	–	–
Fringe benefits	–	–	–	–
Variable remuneration				
Annual bonus: one-year share	–	–	263,956	4.3%
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,198,459	100%	5,883,808	95.7%
Annual bonus: 2021 deferral	496,611	41.4%	1,009,735	16.4%
2018 LTIP tranche	701,848	58.6%	1,537,295	25.0%
2019 LTIP tranche	–	–	3,336,778	54.3%
Pension payments	–	–	–	–
Other payments	–	–	–	–
Total remuneration	1,198,459	100%	6,147,764	100%

Twelve pension recipients received total payments of €5.9 million in the 2024 fiscal year.

2. REMUNERATION OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD

Remuneration for the members of the Supervisory Board is governed by article 17 of the Articles of Association of Deutsche Post AG. The remuneration system was approved by a 99.07% majority of votes cast at the Annual General Meeting on 6 May 2022.

According to this system, Supervisory Board members receive a fixed annual remuneration in the amount of €100,000, plus an attendance fee. The fact that only fixed remuneration is paid ensures that the Supervisory Board performs its control and monitoring tasks independently.

The Supervisory Board chairman and the Supervisory Board committee chairs receive an additional 100% of the remuneration, and the Supervisory Board deputy chair and committee members receive an additional 50%. This does not apply to the Mediation or Nomination Committees.

As in previous years, Supervisory Board members receive an attendance allowance of €1,000 for each plenary meeting of the Supervisory Board or committee meeting that they attended. An attendance allowance is only owed if the total sum of the attendance allowances accruing in a given year does not reach 10% of the total remuneration of the Supervisory Board member, including reimbursements received to cover expenses. The fixed annual remuneration and the attendance allowance become due at the close of the Annual General Meeting in the following fiscal year. Those who only serve on the Supervisory Board or its committees, or act as chair or deputy chair, for part of the fiscal year are remunerated on a pro rata basis. The members of the Supervisory Board are entitled to reimbursement of out-of-pocket cash expenses incurred in the exercise of their office.

The remuneration for activities performed in 2024 totaled €3.8 million (previous year: €3.7 million). Table B shows the remuneration paid to each Supervisory Board member. In addition, Table A shows the remuneration awarded and due for activities in the 2023 fiscal year – in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) – as “remuneration awarded in 2024.”

A. REMUNERATION AWARDED IN 2024 WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 162 (1), NO. 1, OF THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT (AKTIENGESETZ – AKTG) ¹

Members of the Supervisory Board sitting in the fiscal year	Base remuneration	Compensation for membership in committee	Attendance allowance	Total remuneration
	€	€	€	€
Dr. Nikolaus von Bomhard (Chair)	200,000	250,000	18,000	468,000
Andrea Kocsis (Deputy Chair)	150,000	200,000	14,000	364,000
Silke Busch (since May 4, 2023)	66,301	–	3,000	69,301
Dr. Mario Daberkow	100,000	–	4,000	104,000
Ingrid Deltenre	100,000	100,000	12,000	212,000
Jörg von Dosky	100,000	50,000	11,000	161,000
Thomas Held	100,000	100,000	13,000	213,000
Dr. Heinrich Hiesinger	100,000	50,000	9,000	159,000
Prof. Dr. Luise Hölscher ²	100,000	100,000	13,000	213,000
Mario Jacubasch	100,000	50,000	8,000	158,000
Thorsten Kühn	100,000	50,000	8,000	158,000
Ulrike Lennartz-Pipenbacher	100,000	–	4,000	104,000
Simone Menne	100,000	50,000	9,000	159,000
Yusuf Özdemir	100,000	50,000	11,000	161,000
Lawrence Rosen	100,000	50,000	10,000	160,000
Dr. Stefan Schulte	100,000	100,000	11,000	211,000
Dr. Katrin Suder (since May 4, 2023)	66,301	–	3,000	69,301
Stephan Teuscher	100,000	100,000	16,000	216,000
Stefanie Weckesser	100,000	50,000	11,000	161,000
Stefan B. Wintels	100,000	50,000	9,000	159,000

1 Remuneration for activities in the 2023 fiscal year paid in the spring of 2024.

2 At Luise Hölscher's request, any portion of the remuneration exceeding the amount of €6,100 approved under civil service law will be paid directly to the federal treasury.

REMUNERATION AWARDED IN 2024 – FORMER SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS

Supervisory Board members who left in the 2023 fiscal year	Base remuneration	Compensation for membership in committee	Attendance allowance	Total remuneration
	€	€	€	€
Gabriele Gülzau (until May 4, 2023)	33,972	–	1,000	34,972
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Katja Windt (until May 4, 2023)	33,972	–	1,000	34,972

B. REMUNERATION FOR ACTIVITIES IN THE 2024 FISCAL YEAR ¹

Members of the Supervisory Board sitting in the fiscal year	Base remuneration	Compensation for membership in committee	Attendance allowance	Total remuneration
	€	€	€	€
Dr. Nikolaus von Bomhard (Chair)	200,000	250,000	21,000	471,000
Andrea Kocsis (Deputy Chair)	150,000	200,000	20,000	370,000
Prof. Dr. Dr. Ann-Kristin Achleitner (from May 3, 2024)	66,393	33,196	12,000	111,589
Silke Busch	100,000	–	6,000	106,000
Dr. Mario Daberkow	100,000	–	6,000	106,000
Ingrid Deltenre	100,000	100,000	15,000	215,000
Jörg von Dosky	100,000	50,000	14,000	164,000
Dr. Hans Ulrich Engel (from May 3, 2024)	66,393	66,393	12,000	144,786
Thomas Held	100,000	100,000	16,000	216,000
Dr. Heinrich Hiesinger	100,000	50,000	12,000	162,000
Prof. Dr. Luise Hölscher ²	100,000	100,000	17,000	217,000
Mario Jacobasch	100,000	50,000	10,000	160,000
Thorsten Kühn	100,000	50,000	10,000	160,000
Ulrike Lennartz-Pipenbacher	100,000	–	6,000	106,000
Simone Menne (until May 3, 2024)	33,879	16,940	2,000	52,819
Yusuf Özdemir	100,000	50,000	13,000	163,000
Lawrence Rosen	100,000	50,000	14,000	164,000
Dr. Stefan Schulte (until May 3, 2024)	33,879	33,879	2,000	69,758
Dr. Katrin Suder	100,000	–	6,000	106,000
Stephan Teuscher	100,000	100,000	17,000	217,000
Stefanie Weckesser	100,000	50,000	14,000	164,000
Stefan B. Wintels	100,000	50,000	12,000	162,000

1 Will be paid out in the spring of 2025.

2 At Luise Hölscher's request, any portion of the remuneration exceeding the amount of €6,100 approved under civil service law will be paid directly to the federal treasury

3. REMUNERATION OF THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS, THE SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS AND THE EMPLOYEES ON A FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT BASIS RELATIVE TO THE COMPANY'S EARNINGS PERFORMANCE

The following table sets out the remuneration awarded and due in the individual fiscal years to the Board of Management members and the Supervisory Board members active in the fiscal year, the remuneration awarded and due in the individual fiscal years to the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board members who have left the Company in the last ten years and the remuneration of the other employees together with selected earnings indicators. Earnings are shown in terms of consolidated net profit, Group EAC and Group FCF, as reported in the respective fiscal year. These figures are the Group's main performance indicators and therefore also constitute material performance criteria for the annual bonus of the Board of Management. In accordance with the regulatory requirements that call for the use of the company's earnings performance for this purpose, Deutsche Post AG's net profit for the fiscal year has been added. The average total remuneration of employees, which has been included for comparison purposes, was calculated on the basis of staff costs of DHL Group divided by the average number of DHL Group employees for the year and adjusted on the basis of full-time equivalents. The Board of Management was not included in calculating staff costs or the number of employees. To ensure consistency in the comparison with the remuneration awarded and due to the Board of Management members and the Supervisory Board members, pension scheme expenses have also been eliminated.

DEVELOPMENT OF REMUNERATION AND EARNINGS

	Percentage change 2020/2021	Percentage change 2021/2022	2023	Percentage change 2022/2023	2024	Percentage change 2023/2024
Development of the total remuneration of the Board of Management members						
€						
Dr. Tobias Meyer	28	29	4,076,924 ¹	162	2,427,728 ²	-40
Oscar de Bok	35	22	1,701,177	28	1,681,113	-1
Pablo Ciano	-	n. a. ³	1,089,330	192	1,217,779	12
Nikola Hagleitner	-	n. a. ³	1,067,550	143	1,207,937	13
Melanie Kreis	464	-81	5,054,029 ⁴	179	2,983,381 ⁵	-41
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	238	-61	4,563,171 ⁴	174	2,278,039 ⁵	-50
John Pearson	21	35	4,803,451 ¹	179	1,762,852 ²	-63
Tim Scharwath	207	-61	4,481,685 ⁴	161	2,338,352 ⁵	-48
Development of the total remuneration of the Supervisory Board members						
€						
Dr. Nikolaus von Bomhard (Chair)	1	-1	468,000	40	468,000	0
Andrea Kocsis (Deputy Chair)	1	0	365,000	39	364,000	0
Silke Busch	-	-	-	-	69,301 ⁶	n. a. ³
Dr. Mario Daberkow	3	-1	104,000	39	104,000	0
Ingrid Deltenre	16	17	214,000	40	212,000	-1
Jörg von Dosky	3	-1	150,042	100	161,000	7
Thomas Held	2	8	211,000	70	213,000	1
Dr. Heinrich Hiesinger	92	29	158,000	36	159,000	1
Prof. Dr. Luise Hölscher	-	-	161,865 ^{6,7}	n. a. ³	213,000 ⁷	32
Mario Jacobasch	3	13	158,000	83	158,000	0
Thorsten Kühn	n. a. ³	170	158,000	40	158,000	0

DEVELOPMENT OF REMUNERATION AND EARNINGS

	Percentage change 2020/2021	Percentage change 2021/2022	2023	Percentage change 2022/2023	2024	Percentage change 2023/2024
Ulrike Lennartz-Pipenbacher	3	-1	104,000	39	104,000	0
Simone Menne	4	-3	161,000	38	159,000	-1
Yusuf Özdemir	-	n. a. ³	161,000	329	161,000	0
Lawrence Rosen	n. a. ³	165	150,042	100	160,000	7
Dr. Stefan Schulte	3	-3	212,000	39	211,000	0
Dr. Katrin Suder	-	-	-	-	69,301 ⁶	n. a. ³
Stephan Teuscher	16	17	213,000	35	216,000	1
Stefanie Weckesser	4	-3	162,000	38	161,000	-1
Stefan B. Wintels	-	-	104,630 ⁶	n. a. ³	159,000	52

Development of the total remuneration of Board of Management members who left the company in previous years

€						
Ken Allen	167	-4	3,619,806 ⁸	-61	1,198,459 ⁸	-67
Dr. Frank Appel	2	-44	38,573,155 ^{9,10}	607	6,147,764 ⁸	-84

Development of the total remuneration of former Supervisory Board members

€						
Gabriele Gülzau	3	-1	104,000	39	34,972 ⁶	-66
Prof. Dr.-Ing Katja Windt	3	-1	104,000	39	34,972 ⁶	-66

Development of the average total remuneration of the workforce

€						
Total workforce of DHL Group ¹¹	2	6	47,381	3	49,419	4

Earnings performance

€m						
Consolidated net profit ¹²	70	6	3,677	-31	3,332	-9
Group EAC	136	-1	2,860	-44	2,207	-23
Free cash flow Group	61	-25	2,942	-4	2,944	0
Deutsche Post AG net profit (HGB)	35	-34	2,786	7	2,825	1

1 Includes payouts under the long-term component for the first time since the member's appointment.

2 No payouts under the long-term component.

3 Comparison with previous year not possible.

4 Includes payouts under the long-term component. No rights were exercised in the previous year.

5 Lower payouts under the long-term component compared with the previous year.

6 Pro rata remuneration in the year of entry/exit.

7 At Luise Hölscher's request, any portion of the remuneration exceeding the amount of €6,100 approved under civil service law will be paid directly to the federal treasury.

8 Remuneration from trailing remuneration components.

9 Includes lump-sum amount from the capitalization of benefits under the pension commitment.

10 Including remuneration as an active Board of Management member.

11 Not adjusted for currency effects; change excluding currency effects (all years calculated @AOP 2024): 2020/2021: 2%; 2021/2022: 3%; 2022/2023: 5%; 2023/2024: 4%.

12 After deduction of noncontrolling interests.

REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR ON THE AUDIT OF THE REMUNERATION REPORT IN ACCOR- DANCE WITH SECTION 162 (3) AKTG

To Deutsche Post AG, Bonn

Audit Opinion

We conducted a formal audit of the remuneration report of Deutsche Post AG, Bonn, for the financial year from 1 January to 31 December 2024 to assess whether the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) have been made in the remuneration report. In accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG, we have not audited the content of the remuneration report.

In our opinion, the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG have been made, in all material respects, in the accompanying remuneration report. Our audit opinion does not cover the content of the remuneration report.

Basis for the Audit Opinion

We conducted our audit of the remuneration report in accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG and in compliance with the IDW Auditing Standard: Audit of the Remuneration Report pursuant to Section 162 (3) AktG (IDW AuS 870 (09.2023)). Our responsibilities under those requirements and this standard are further described in the “Auditor’s Responsibilities” section of our report. Our audit firm has applied the IDW Quality Assurance Standard: Requirements for Quality Management in the Audit Firm (IDW QS 1). We have fulfilled our professional responsibilities in accordance with the German Public Auditor Act (WPO) and the Professional Charter for German Public Auditors and German Sworn Auditors (BS WP/vBP) including the requirements on independence.

Responsibilities of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board

The executive board and the supervisory board are responsible for the preparation of the remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that complies with the requirements of Section 162 AktG. In addition, they are responsible for such internal control as they have determined necessary to enable the preparation of a remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

Auditor’s Responsibilities

Our objective is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG have been made, in all material respects, in the remuneration report, and to express an opinion on this in a report on the audit.

We planned and conducted our audit in such a way to be able to determine whether the remuneration report is formally complete by comparing the disclosures made in the remuneration report with the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG. In accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG, we have neither audited the correctness of the content of the disclosures, nor the completeness of the content of the individual disclosures, nor the adequate presentation of the remuneration report.

Düsseldorf, 5 March 2025

Deloitte GmbH

Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft

Prof. Dr. Frank Beine
Wirtschaftsprüfer
(German Public Auditor)

Martin C. Bornhofen
Wirtschaftsprüfer
(German Public Auditor)