

REMUNERATION REPORT 2025

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REMUNERATION REPORT

The remuneration report provides detailed and individualized information on the remuneration awarded and due to the active and former members of the Board of Management and Supervisory Board of Deutsche Post AG in the 2025 fiscal year. It has been prepared by the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board in accordance with the requirements of the *Aktiengesetz* (AktG – German Stock Corporation Act). Information beyond what is included in this remuneration report concerning the remuneration system for the Board of Management members and the remuneration adopted for the Supervisory Board members in the Annual General Meeting of 2022 can be found on the [company's website](#). On May 2, 2025, the Annual General Meeting approved the remuneration report for the 2024 fiscal year with a majority of 96.74% of the votes cast. No fundamental changes were therefore made to the presentation of remuneration, and the transparent disclosure of the remuneration of the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board was continued for 2025. The 2025 remuneration report will be presented at the Annual General Meeting on May 5, 2026, for approval by the shareholders.

1. REMUNERATION OF THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS

The remuneration system applicable to the 2025 remuneration was adopted by the Supervisory Board in December 2020 and approved at the Annual General Meeting of 2021 with a majority of 93.39% of the votes cast. The system is designed to provide incentives for the successful implementation of the corporate strategy as well as the sustainable development of the Group and is largely geared toward creating long-term value for shareholders. It complies with the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act and the recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code (*Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex* – the Code). Furthermore, the Supervisory Board aims to set the remuneration so that it is competitive and in line with market standards in order to attract and retain the best candidates for Board of Management positions. In structuring the remuneration, the Supervisory Board also ensures that it is aligned to the remuneration system for executives so that matching performance incentives are provided.

THE 2025 FISCAL YEAR

DHL Group's business was shaped by continuing macroeconomic challenges once again in 2025. Yet despite a slight fall in revenue and amid a still volatile environment, DHL Group succeeded in continuously increasing profitability through rigorous yield, cost and capacity management and generated a strong free cash flow. DHL Group achieved EBIT of €6,103 million and a free cash flow (excluding M&A) of €3,201 million in 2025. The annual results show that, with its broad logistics portfolio, DHL Group remains very favorably and resiliently positioned in the still challenging macroeconomic environment.


Thanks to this resilience, DHL Group was able to continue investing in quality for customers and in growth markets such as the Asia, Middle East and Africa regions as well as in the life sciences and healthcare logistics segments. The Group also drove digitalization extensively, for instance through the increased use of AI agents and robots. These measures are improving DHL Group's efficiency as well as the quality of its services. The Group continued to pursue the implementation of the sustainability targets through a range of measures again in the 2025 fiscal year. DHL Group views sustainability and sustainable business practices above all as an opportunity and regards them as a meaningful factor in differentiating itself from the competition. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were down by 4.3% year on year to 32.31 million tonnes of CO₂e. Targeted decarbonization measures alone cut CO₂e by 2,083 kilotonnes. Through strategic partnerships and long-term purchase agreements, DHL Group was able, despite the still tight availability, to increase the share of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF, including mandatory fuel blending) in its own fleet (Scope 1) to 10.0% – a figure well above the industry average. In the area of sustainability, the Group also continued to concentrate on providing a safe and motivating work environment and on ensuring transparent, legally compliant business practices across the Group along with a high level of cybersecurity.

REMUNERATION IN 2025 AT A GLANCE

The achievement of the financial targets for the annual bonus reflects DHL Group's solid performance in the 2025 fiscal year. The central steering metric of EBIT after asset charge (EAC) was around 6.6% above the previous year's level in 2025. Free cash flow (FCF) without M&A also increased year on year. The strong FCF forms the basis to balance reliable, attractive shareholder returns with targeted growth investments as part of "Strategy 2030 – Accelerate Sustainable Growth." The Supervisory Board has resolved to adjust the FCF used to measure the Board of Management's performance for the net non-recurring effects from M&A activities in the 2025 fiscal year, to the extent these effects were not already included in the planning. This is in order to adequately assess Board members' underlying operational performance and avoid setting the wrong incentives with regard to Strategy 2030, which also includes inorganic growth options (FCF excluding M&A). With respect to the nonfinancial performance criteria, which consisted exclusively of sustainability targets based on the company strategy, target achievement came in between around 117% and 125%. The degree of total target achievement for the annual bonus of Board of Management members active for the entire 2025 fiscal year stood at between approximately 112% and approximately 117%. The target relevant for payment of the proportion of the annual bonus deferred in the 2023 fiscal year was reached, because the Group's EAC was cumulatively positive during the sustainability phase.

By contrast, in the case of the long-term component for which the lock-up period ended in the reporting year (2021 SAR tranche), none of the six performance targets were reached, as both the absolute performance of Deutsche Post shares and their relative performance versus the STOXX Europe 600 were negative at the end of the lock-up period. The 2021 SAR tranche therefore lapsed without replacement or compensation, meaning it will never give rise to any payments.

The charts below, which are broken down by individual variable remuneration components, provide an initial overview of the targets achieved by the Board of Management in the 2025 fiscal year:

ANNUAL BONUS 2025: OVERVIEW OF TARGET ACHIEVEMENT


1 Financial targets (€m); Realized Decarbonization Effects (kilotonnes of CO₂e WtW); Employee Engagement (% approval); Cybersecurity Rating (points); EAC: EBIT after asset charge (including the asset charge on goodwill and before goodwill impairment); Group EAC is weighted at 50% for Board of Management members responsible for the divisions and the EAC of the respective division for which they are responsible at 10%. For the other members of the Board of Management, Group EAC is weighted at 60%.

2 Incl. € 250 million overall budget for M&A.

3 Reported FCF excluding M&A of €3,201 million less €250 million overall budget for M&A activities.

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR 2023 MEDIUM-TERM COMPONENT

2023	2024	2025	Spring 2026
Annual bonus	Deferral		Determination of target achievement
	CRITERION 1¹: EAC 2025 > EAC 2023		2,354 < 2,860 <input type="checkbox"/>
	or CRITERION 2¹: EAC 2024 + EAC 2025 > 0		2,207 + 2,354 > 0 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

1 EAC (€m).

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE 2021 SAR TRANCHE

SAR performance targets	Thresholds	Target achievement
Performance versus STOXX Europe 600	+10%	✘
	+0%	✘
Absolute increase in share price	+25%	✘
	+20%	✘
	+15%	✘
	+10%	✘

OUTLOOK FOR REMUNERATION IN 2026

The Supervisory Board fundamentally revised the Board of Management remuneration system in 2024. The objective was to appropriately reflect the further development of the strategic bottom lines, which form part of Strategy 2030, in the incentive system for members of the Board of Management. The revised remuneration system (also referred to hereinafter as the “2026 remuneration system”) was approved by the Annual General Meeting on May 2, 2025, with a majority of 95.39% of the votes cast and entered into force on January 1, 2026. All incumbent members of the Board of Management have modified their employment contracts to reflect the 2026 remuneration system. A detailed description of the new remuneration system can be found on the [company’s website](#) .

Under the 2026 remuneration system, the performance of the Board of Management members will be measured in both the short-term variable remuneration (annual bonus) and long-term component (LTI) against a combination of financial and non-financial (sustainability) targets, with the financial indicators making up the large majority of the target portfolio for the variable remuneration. This is to provide the Board of Management with a strong incentive to achieve both short- and long-term strategic targets. To avoid double dipping, different performance criteria are used in the annual bonus and LTI.

Starting in 2026, the following financial performance criteria, based on the annual planning, will be relevant for the amount of the annual bonus :

- **EBIT** (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) for the Group and divisions: As a key performance indicator for Group management that provides an incentive for profitable growth of the operating business, EBIT will be weighted at 60% in the annual bonus for all Board of Management members. The performance of members of the Board of Management without direct responsibility for a division will be measured using Group EBIT. For the members with responsibility for a division, Group EBIT will be weighted at 40% and EBIT of the respective division for which they are responsible at 20%.
- **FCF** (Free Cash Flow): A further 10% of the annual bonus will depend on the development of FCF, which represents another key performance indicator for Group management. This will provide an incentive to generate sufficient cash for dividends, debt repayment or other purposes (e.g. funding pension obligations). FCF excluding M&A will be the relevant figure for measuring the Board of Management’s performance. This is in order to adequately assess Board members’ underlying operational performance and avoid setting the wrong incentives with regard to Strategy 2030, which also includes inorganic growth options.

The targets for the long-term component, the new Performance Share Plan (PSP), will be based on the Group's medium-term planning. They are designed to encourage long-term growth in enterprise value in line with Strategy 2030.

- **TSR** (Total Shareholder Return): A third of target achievement for the long-term component will depend on the development of TSR for Deutsche Post shares relative to the performance of the STOXX Europe 600 index. This external, market-based target provides an incentive to outperform the peer group long-term and is consistent with the Group's aim of offering shareholders an attractive investment opportunity.
- **ROIC** (Return on Invested Capital): Another third of target achievement depends on the development in ROIC. This underscores the focus on effective use of capital and lasting improvement in the Group's return on investment.

Alongside financial performance, the Board of Management will also continue to be measured by the company's progress on DHL Group's targets in the areas of environment, social responsibility and governance ("ESG"), with all three target categories influencing variable remuneration in 2026:

- **Environment – "E-targets"**: Decarbonizing logistics services is vital to support DHL Group's long-term success and competitiveness. The Supervisory Board has therefore decided to provide a strong remuneration-based incentive to achieve the Group's environmental goals by basing sustainability target achievement for the 2026 tranche of the new PSP solely on environmental progress. The target values for determining target achievement are based on the Group's medium-term planning for the years 2026-2028. Measurement of target achievement will be at the end of the performance period using the "Realized Decarbonization Effects" key performance indicator for Group management.
- **Social responsibility – "S-targets"**: Social responsibility will be included in the annual bonus in 2026 by applying not just one but two performance criteria whose relevance was identified in the materiality analysis: Employee satisfaction will continue to be measured using the "Employee Engagement" KPI, which is based on the Group's annual Employee Opinion Survey. Additionally, the LTIFR (Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate) will be target-relevant for the first time in 2026. Ensuring the health and safety of the approximately 584,000 employees worldwide is of paramount importance to DHL Group. A low LTIFR reflects effective prevention of accidents at work and a safe working environment.
- **Governance – "G-targets"**: In the area of governance, cybersecurity will remain a key performance criterion in the annual bonus in 2026. Robust protection against cyber threats is an integral part of the Group's risk management and is crucial to DHL Group's business success. Performance measurement will be based on the BitSight rating, which enables a standardized, objective and transparent assessment of cybersecurity.

OVERVIEW OF THE REMUNERATION COMPONENTS

In the 2025 fiscal year, the Board of Management's remuneration continued to be based on the remuneration system approved by the Annual General Meeting in 2021. It comprised the following components:

REMUNERATION COMPONENTS

Component	Objective	Design
Fixed remuneration		
Base salary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Serves to attract and retain Board of Management members who, due to their experience and expertise, are able to develop and successfully implement the strategy; simultaneously fosters an independent, risk-adjusted and autonomous management of the company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fixed, contractually agreed annual remuneration, generally paid monthly in 12 equal amounts
Fringe benefits		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mainly the personal use of a company car (including the services of a driver, if applicable), allowances for health and long-term care insurance in analogous application of the regulations and benefits under German social insurance law, and benefits in cases where two households are maintained
Pension commitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensures adequate income in retirement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual contribution of 35% of the base salary Pension contributions allocated up to and including 2020: interest rate in accordance with "iBoxx Corporates AA10+ Annual Yield," but at least 2.25% Pension contributions allocated as of 2021: interest rate in accordance with weighted annual interest rate of overall pension assets of all German pension schemes of Deutsche Post, but at least 1% Payment of a pension substitute possible as an alternative
Variable remuneration		
Annual bonus with medium-term component (deferral)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promotes profitable growth in consideration of the overall responsibility of the Board of Management, sustainable business development and the performance of the individual Board of Management members Provides incentives for Board of Management members to concentrate on successfully carrying out annual business priorities The deferred component, which is subject to an additional performance criterion, reinforces the focus of the Board of Management remuneration upon the company's long-term performance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target amount: 80% of the respective base salary Payout: 50% in the following year, 50% after an additional two years (sustainability phase), but only if the asset charge is earned at the end of the sustainability phase (medium-term component) Deferral designed as a malus provision 70% financial performance targets and 30% sustainability targets Option for an increase/decrease of up to 20% in the event of exceptional developments Maximum amount (cap): 120% of the respective base salary possible in the event of exceptional developments
Long-term component – Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fosters sustainable, positive development of the company's value and aligns the interests of the Board of Management members to those of shareholders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plan type: Stock appreciation rights (SAR) Amount allocated: 100% of the base salary Personal investment: 10% of the base salary; the Board of Management members must execute the personal investment in shares of the company; by way of exception, it may also take the form of cash. In 2025, all Board of Management members executed the personal investment in shares Six equally weighted performance targets based on share price: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Absolute increase in share price (weighting: 4/6) Relative performance versus the STOXX Europe 600 (weighting: 2/6) Maximum amount (cap): 4 times the base salary (2.5 times the base salary for the CEO) Exercisability: based on performance targets reached after four years Cash payout: in the fifth or sixth year after allocation, depending on the individual exercise date

The following other contractual terms and conditions apply to all Board of Management members:

OTHER CONTRACTUAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Component	Details
Cap on maximum total remuneration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In addition to individual caps on the variable remuneration components, there is an overall cap; first of all, this limits the remuneration arising from target remuneration in a given year (target remuneration cap; cap on remuneration granted according to the terminology of the 2017 Code); since 2022, the payments attributable to a fiscal year have also been limited. Cap for regular members of the Board of Management: €5.15 million (target remuneration cap up to and including 2020: €5 million excluding fringe benefits); amount of cap for CEO: €8.15 million (target remuneration cap up to and including 2020: €8 million excluding fringe benefits)
Malus and clawback provisions relating to variable remuneration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SARs are granted on the condition that the Supervisory Board may cap the payout amount in the event of any exceptional developments The Supervisory Board may also increase or decrease the annual bonus by up to 20% in the event of any exceptional developments 50% of the annual bonus resulting from target achievement is transferred into the medium-term component and is subject to a two-year sustainability phase. Medium-term component is withheld if the sustainability target EAC is not met during the sustainability phase. The SARs granted are clawed back and lapse without replacement if and to the extent that the absolute or relative performance targets are not met during the four-year lock-up period The general statutory clawback rules additionally apply within the statutory limitation periods
Share ownership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As the targets are based solely on the share price, the LTIP is closely and directly aligned with shareholders' interests; this ensures matching interests Earnings potential per tranche: 2.5 times (CEO) or 4 times (Board of Management members) the base salary; cumulative effect over multiple years Personal investment of 10% of the annual base salary per LTIP tranche required from each board member, primarily in the form of shares of the company
Income from mandates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Remuneration from Group mandates: must be relinquished in full Remuneration from external mandates: does not have to be relinquished
Commitments in connection with the cessation of service on the Board of Management	
Change of control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Board of Management members have a right to early termination within six months after a change of control (effective from the end of the month subject to three months' notice); no right to claim severance payment/no special benefits upon the exercise of this right
Inability to work or death	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Temporary inability to work: remuneration continued for 12 months or until the end of the contract at the latest Permanent inability to work: contract expires at the end of the quarter in which the permanent inability to work is determined Expiry of contract due to death or permanent inability to work: the annual base salary and maximum annual bonus, prorated in each case, continue to be paid for six months following the end of the month in which the Board of Management contract ends or until the scheduled expiration date of the contract, whichever is the earlier
Post-contractual non-compete clause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Duration: one year after leaving the Board of Management Compensation: one base salary Subject to deduction of income from other work, financial settlements and pension payments; the company may waive the noncompete clause; duty to pay compensation expires six months after receipt of declaration
Termination by mutual consent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Early termination of service on the Board of Management by mutual consent: remuneration of no more than the value of the claims arising in the remaining term of the contract; payments capped at the value of two years' annual remuneration including fringe benefits (severance payment cap); the severance payment cap is calculated exclusive of long-term remuneration. Variable remuneration components paid out pursuant to the originally agreed conditions and at the originally agreed times; no early payout of variable remuneration components Early termination is instigated by the Board of Management member: no severance payment; annual bonus paid out pro rata in accordance with the level of target achievement at the end of the performance period Claims under the LTIP: see detailed description in remuneration system

Further details on the remuneration components and the other contractual terms and conditions can be found in the description of the remuneration system on the [company's website](#). Remuneration in the 2025 fiscal year was consistent with all the stipulations of the remuneration system.

DETAILS OF FIXED REMUNERATION

The base salaries of regular Board of Management members active for the entire year ranged from €941,625 to €1,010,824 in the 2025 fiscal year. The Chief Executive Officer received a base salary of €1,500,000. The Board of Management members received fringe benefits of between 1% and 9% of their base salary. The individual amounts are shown in the table titled **Total remuneration for the fiscal year**.

The Supervisory Board regularly reviews whether Board of Management remuneration is appropriate and in line with customary market standards, with the support of an independent remuneration consultant if necessary.

As is customary at DHL Group, the base salaries of regular Board of Management members were adjusted by 3-5% as part of the planned review upon reappointment or after a contract term of three years. Maximum remuneration did not change, remaining at €5.15 million in all cases. The total target remuneration of all Board of Management members in 2025 remained significantly below the median of the DAX 40 peer group.

The Board of Management members have been granted individually agreed-upon direct pension commitments. These were granted within the framework of a contribution-based system. Hendrik Venter has not been granted any pension commitment. He received a pension substitute. With the exception of Oscar de Bok, who is making use of the transitional arrangement under the new remuneration system until September 30, 2027, the Board of Management members received pension contributions for the final time in 2025.

The main elements of the pension commitments granted can be seen in the following table:

Aspect	Description
Type of retirement benefit	Capital payment with annuity option
Retirement age	62 years
Contribution amount	35% of base salary, limited to 15 years
Invalidity and survivor's pension	Payout of the pension account balance without any risk benefit
Interest	Pension contributions allocated up to and including 2020 in accordance with "iBoxx Corporates AA10+ Annual Yield," but at least 2.25%. Pension contributions allocated as of 2021: weighted annual interest rate of overall pension assets of all German pension schemes of Deutsche Post, however no less than 1%
Annuity adjustment	1% annually

The service cost in accordance with IAS 19 arising in the 2025 fiscal year and the present values of the pension commitments calculated in accordance with IFRS as of the end of the 2025 fiscal year, together with the comparison figures for the previous year, are set out in the following table:


CONTRIBUTION-BASED PENSION COMMITMENTS: INDIVIDUAL BREAKDOWN

€	Service cost for 2024	Service cost for 2025	Present value (DBO) as of December 31, 2024	Present value (DBO) as of December 31, 2025
Dr. Tobias Meyer	521,103	559,470	2,518,994	2,993,629
Oscar de Bok	322,726	340,781	2,128,502	2,525,368
Pablo Ciano	299,004	359,492	787,960	1,134,993
Nikola Hagleitner	295,146	361,777	850,787	1,172,645
Melanie Kreis	346,360	370,396	4,379,908	4,762,370
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	340,584	356,665	2,596,879	2,874,507
John Pearson	322,681	353,276	2,029,198	2,478,762
Tim Scharwath (until August 15, 2025)	338,704	215,660	2,584,140	2,870,037
Total	2,786,308	2,917,517	17,876,368	20,812,311

Further details on the fixed remuneration can be found in the table **Remuneration components** and the description of the remuneration system on the **company's website** [↗](#).

DETAILS OF VARIABLE REMUNERATION

The variable remuneration of the Board of Management members constitutes a major part of their total remuneration. In 2025, it was composed of the annual bonus connected with a medium-term component and a long-term component. The variable remuneration is tied to the performance of the Board of Management. It creates incentives for the implementation of the corporate strategy and a value-creating and long-term development of the company in the interests of all stakeholder groups. The annual bonus – in combination with its medium-term component, which provides for a two-year sustainability phase with its own performance criterion – focuses on the annual targets derived from the company's strategy and simultaneously ensures that these are sustainably pursued. The long-term component aims at a sustainable increase of the company's value and directly links the interests of the Board of Management members with the long-term shareholder interest through its share price-based performance targets.

DURATION OF VARIABLE REMUNERATION COMPONENTS


Annual bonus

The annual bonus for 2025 is based on financial targets (70%) and nonfinancial sustainability targets (30%). It has the following structure:


PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 2025

Performance criterion	Weighting	Incentive effect/strategic connection
Group EAC ¹	50%/60% ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key performance indicator for the company Adds a cost of capital component to EBIT to encourage the efficient use of resources and to ensure that the operating business is geared towards increasing value sustainably and generating increasing cash flow
Divisional EAC ¹	0%/10% ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measurement of individual performance in the respective Board departments Incentive for high profitability in the respective division
Free cash flow	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key performance indicator for the company Measure of how much cash the company generates, taking into account payments arising from the Group's operations as well as capital expenditure and lease and interest payments Indicator of how much cash is available to the company for paying dividends, for repaying debt or for other purposes (e.g. funding pension obligations)
E – Realized Decarbonization Effects	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Serves the implementation of the target of reducing CO₂ emissions and offering climate-friendly logistics services
S – Employee Engagement	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures progress in achieving the target of being an Employer of Choice
G – Cybersecurity Rating	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures the success of cybersecurity management Serves to ensure trustworthy, transparent and legally compliant business practices

1 Including the asset charge on goodwill and before goodwill impairment (EAC for short in the entire remuneration report).

2 Group EAC is weighted at 50% for Board of Management members responsible for the divisions and the EAC of the respective division for which they are responsible at 10%. For the other members of the Board of Management, Group EAC is weighted at 60%. Due to the particular significance of their individual performance for the results of the Group as a whole, individual targets have not been set for the CEO or for the Board members responsible for finance and HR.

CALCULATION OF THE ANNUAL BONUS 2025



1 Below a target achievement of 62.5%, the respective target is missed.

In the spring of 2026, the Supervisory Board determined the achievement of the financial targets as follows:

2025 FINANCIAL TARGETS – TARGET ACHIEVEMENT

Target	Target amount €m	Actual amount €m	Target achievement %
Group EAC	2,252	2,354	111.33
Divisional EAC			
Post & Parcel Germany	214	258	125.00
Global Forwarding, Freight	312	63	0.00
Express	1,697	1,764	109.85
Supply Chain	438	469	117.61
eCommerce	27	132	125.00
Group Free cash flow	2,543 ¹	2,951 ²	125.00

1 Including €250 million overall budget for M&A.

2 Reported FCF excluding M&A of €3,201 million less €250 million overall budget for M&A activities.

In accordance with the provisions of the remuneration system, the target agreements of the Board of Management members contained 30% sustainability targets. The three sustainability categories were each weighted at 10%.

Environment – “E-target”: The business activities of DHL Group impact the environment mainly in the form of logistics-related greenhouse gases (GHG), which arise directly in relation to the transport business and contribute to climate change. This entity-specific consideration accounts for Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions as well as Scope 3 emissions in GHG Protocol categories 3 “Fuel and Energy-Related Activities,” 4 “Upstream Transportation and Distribution” and 6 “Business Travel.” DHL Group aims to reduce the GHG emissions it causes, as well as its dependency on fossil fuels, in order to mitigate the impact of its operations on the global climate.

In order to achieve the strategic target of reducing emissions, the Board of Management was again measured by the KPI Realized Decarbonization Effects in 2025. DHL Group aimed to generate Realized Decarbonization Effects of 2 million tonnes of CO₂e WtW in 2025 through targeted measures. The savings achieved in the reporting year amounted to 2,083 kilotonnes of CO₂e WtW, resulting in target achievement of 120.75% for the corresponding Board of Management target.

Social Responsibility – “S-target”: With approximately 584,000 employees, DHL Group is one of the world’s largest private sector employers and aims to position itself as an Employer of Choice. Through their daily commitment, our employees make a decisive contribution to the quality of DHL Group’s services and strengthen customers’ trust. DHL Group creates an environment that promotes motivation and performance so that it can recruit capable and committed people, nurture their continuing professional development and retain them long-term. Each year, the Group measures employee satisfaction and engagement by conducting a Group-wide, anonymous survey. This important tool helps determine where DHL Group is in its journey toward becoming an Employer of Choice. The Group analyzes the annual survey to derive the Employee Engagement KPI, which represents the aggregated and weighted results of five statements by employees in the Group-wide survey.

In 2025, 77% of employees once again took the opportunity to express their opinion and provide feedback. The feedback provides the basis for creating a working environment in which employees are able to tap into their full potential, thus living up to the strategic goal of being an “Employer of Choice.” The company intends to consistently maintain Employee Engagement at 80% or higher across the Group between now and 2030. With Employee Engagement at 82% in 2025, as in the previous year, this target was exceeded once again. Target achievement for the corresponding Board of Management target was 116.67%.

EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT KPI – DEVELOPMENT

Employee Engagement	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Approval (%)	84	83	83	82	82

Governance – “G-target”: DHL Group uses its cybersecurity management activities to protect the information of the Group, its business partners and its employees as well as IT systems from unauthorized access or manipulation and data misuse. This also enables uninterrupted availability and reliable operations. The internal guidelines and processes are based on the international standard ISO 27002, and our data centers are certified in accordance with ISO 27001.

Cybersecurity undergoes independent assessment by the external rating agency BitSight. This cybersecurity rating is based on the technical analysis of any weaknesses and points the company to any possible security risks on a daily basis through an automated service. Compared with a self-assessment, an external cybersecurity rating offers greater transparency and, thanks to its standardized nature, enables comparison with other companies. DHL Group compares its performance with the DAX 40 companies as well as with major customers and logistics companies not covered by this index. The target value is determined by the aspiration to be within the upper quarter of this comparison group.

For 2025, DHL Group therefore initially aimed for a rating of at least 710 points. Following a change to the evaluation scale by BitSight in July 2025, the target for 2025 was 720 points. DHL Group’s rating amounted to 780 of 820 achievable points as of the end of the year. The target for the 2025 reporting year was therefore exceeded.

2025 NONFINANCIAL TARGETS – TARGET ACHIEVEMENT

Target	Target content	Target amount	Actual amount	Target achievement %
E – Environment	Measures for absolute CO ₂ reduction in the Group – Realized Decarbonization Effects	2,000 ¹	2,083 ¹	120.75
S – Social	Employee Opinion Survey (EOS) – Employee Engagement at Group level	80 ²	82 ²	116.67
G – Governance	Cybersecurity rating	720 ³	780 ³	125.00

1 kt CO₂e WtW.

2 Approval (%).

3 Points.

The following table sets out the target achievement determined by the Supervisory Board in the spring of 2026 for the annual bonus for the 2025 fiscal year:

TOTAL TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR ANNUAL BONUS IN THE 2025 FISCAL YEAR (%)

Board of Management member	Target achievement Group EAC	Target achievement Divisional EAC	Target achievement Free cash flow	Target achievement Environment	Target achievement Social	Target achievement Governance	Weighted total target achievement
Dr. Tobias Meyer	111.33	n. a.	125.00	120.75	116.67	125.00	115.54
Oscar de Bok	111.33	117.61/0.00 ¹	125.00	120.75	116.67	125.00	111.74
Pablo Ciano	111.33	125.00	125.00	120.75	116.67	125.00	116.91
Nikola Hagleitner	111.33	125.00	125.00	120.75	116.67	125.00	116.91
Melanie Kreis	111.33	n. a.	125.00	120.75	116.67	125.00	115.54
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	111.33	n. a.	125.00	120.75	116.67	125.00	115.54
John Pearson	111.33	109.85	125.00	120.75	116.67	125.00	115.39
Hendrik Venter (since August 16, 2025)	111.33	117.61	125.00	120.75	116.67	125.00	116.17

¹ For the period from January 1, 2025, to August 15, 2025, Oscar de Bok's performance was measured using target achievement in the Supply Chain division, which was under his responsibility during this time. This was 117.61%. Having taken over the Global Forwarding, Freight division with effect from August 16, 2025, the results in Global Forwarding, Freight were the relevant measure for his division-specific target achievement from this date onward. Target achievement in this division was 0.00%.

One half of the annual bonus will be paid out in the spring of 2026 following the adoption of the consolidated financial statements for the 2025 fiscal year. The other half will be deferred and forms a medium-term component. It is not paid out until after the two-year sustainability phase has expired, i.e. after the consolidated financial statements for the 2027 fiscal year have been adopted in the spring of 2028, but only if, in addition, the EAC sustainability criterion has been achieved during that period. The amounts paid out for the 2025 fiscal year can be seen in the table titled **Total remuneration for the fiscal year**.

Adjustment due to exceptional developments

After his outstanding success as CEO of the DHL Supply Chain division, Oscar de Bok agreed to take over the Global Forwarding, Freight division starting from August 16, 2025, in the context of Tim Scharwath's departure. Had Oscar de Bok remained responsible for Supply Chain, he would have significantly outperformed his division-specific performance target for the annual bonus with a target achievement of 117.61% for the full year 2025. In contrast, the division-specific performance target for Tim Scharwath, which transferred in unchanged form to Oscar de Bok in August 2025, was missed. In the judgment of the Supervisory Board, the annual bonus as calculated based on target achievement by Oscar de Bok in the 2025 fiscal year would not adequately reflect his actual performance when the full picture is considered. It has therefore decided to apply the adjustment factor for exceptional circumstances, which, under the applicable remuneration system, allows for the annual bonus to be adjusted by up to +/-20% from the calculated figure. To put Oscar de Bok in the same financial position he would have been in had he continued to manage his previous division – Supply Chain – for the entirety of the fiscal year, the Supervisory Board has increased the annual bonus calculated based on target achievement by around 4%. This is equivalent to €34,026.

The Personnel Committee of the Supervisory Board is once again convinced that diverse health and safety measures were taken in 2025 to reduce the risk of fatalities as far as possible. The number of fatalities has fallen significantly year on year. There were no fatal accidents involving the Group's own employees in the reporting year. However, DHL Group sadly recorded one fatal accident involving an external employee authorized to give instructions and one fatal accident involving a contractual partner. A safe work environment is paramount at DHL Group. The Group therefore pursues a holistic approach to occupational health and safety. The success of this approach is also reflected in the accident rate (LTIFR – lost time injury frequency rate), which has now seen a sustained decline over many years. Per million hours worked, it has fallen from 21.9 in 2017 to 13.3 in 2025. To underline the importance of creating a safe working environment, the Supervisory Board has decided to link the Board of Management's remuneration to the LTIFR in 2026.

Medium-term component (2023 deferral)

The sustainability phase of the share of the annual bonus deferred in 2023 expired on December 31, 2025. The requirement for payout was that EAC at the end of the sustainability phase exceed EAC for the base year or that cumulative EAC be positive during the sustainability phase, i.e. that the asset charge had been earned. The latter was the case.

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR 2023 MEDIUM-TERM COMPONENT

2023	2024	2025	Spring 2026
Annual bonus	Deferral		Determination of target achievement
	CRITERION 1¹: EAC 2025 > EAC 2023		2,354 < 2,860 ✘
	or CRITERION 2¹: EAC 2024 + EAC 2025 > 0		2,207 + 2,354 > 0 ✔

¹ EAC (€m).

The medium-term component for 2023 will be paid out to the Board of Management members in the spring of 2026 following the adoption of the consolidated financial statements for the 2025 fiscal year. The individual payout amounts are shown in the table titled **Total remuneration for the fiscal year**.

Long-term component (Long-Term Incentive Plan, LTIP)

The long-term component – which was granted in 2025 for the final time in the form of stock appreciation rights (SAR) in the value of an individual base salary – provides an incentive for the company’s long-term and sustainable development. The six performance targets are tied to the share price. They are linked partly to the absolute performance of Deutsche Post shares and partly to their performance relative to the STOXX Europe 600 index. When one of the performance targets is fulfilled, 1/6 of the originally granted SARs becomes exercisable.

If, at the end of the four-year lock-up period, only the targets for share price performance relative to the STOXX Europe 600 have been reached, the share price has additionally to rise over the issue price; otherwise no payout is made.

Details on the structure of the long-term component can be found in the table **Overview of the remuneration components** and the description of the 2021 remuneration system on the [company’s website](#).

Long-term component (LTIP), 2021 tranche

The lock-up period for the 2021 LTIP tranche granted four years previously at an issue price of €58.68 ended on August 31, 2025. The absolute performance of the Deutsche Post share compared with the baseline amounted to -31.96%, and the relative performance compared to the STOXX Europe 600 index was -47.94%. This meant that all performance targets were missed. Due to the missed targets, none of the SARs granted in the 2021 fiscal year have become exercisable. The 2021 tranche has lapsed without replacement or compensation, meaning it will never give rise to any payments.

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE 2021 SAR TRANCHE

SAR performance targets	Thresholds	Target achievement
Performance versus STOXX Europe 600	+10%	×
	+0%	×
Absolute increase in share price	+25%	×
	+20%	×
	+15%	×
	+10%	×

ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE OF THE DEUTSCHE POST SHARE AND PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO THE STOXX EUROPE 600

2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP)					Fully lapsed due to missed targets – not exercisable	
€58.68 ¹				€39.93 ³		
471.78 points ²				547.16 points ³		

1 Issue price (average price of the Deutsche Post share during the 20 trading days preceding the issue date).

2 Start value of the STOXX Europe 600 (average value during the 20 trading days preceding the issue date).

3 Average share price and index value of the last 60 trading days before the end of the lock-up period.

Long-term component (LTIP), 2025 tranche

On September 1, 2025, the members of the Board of Management were again granted SARs as the 2025 tranche. The Board of Management members each received a number of SARs equal in value to their individual base salary on the grant date. The total value of the SARs granted came to €8.23 million in the 2025 fiscal year (previous year: €8.18 million). The value of one SAR as of the grant date was computed by the company actuary and amounted to €9.39. The number of SARs granted to the individual Board of Management members in 2025 can be seen in the table titled **Total SAR holdings as of December 31, 2025** and the value of the SARs granted in the table titled **Target remuneration**.

PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR THE 2025 SAR TRANCHE

SAR performance targets	Thresholds	Target achievement
Performance versus STOXX Europe 600	+10%	606.76 points
	+0%	551.60 points
Absolute increase in share price	+25%	€50.37
	+20%	€48.35
	+15%	€46.34
	+10%	€44.32

The index stood at 551.60 points as of the grant date. The issue price was €40.29. Payments under the 2025 tranche will be made no earlier than September 1, 2029, provided that at least one of the total of six performance targets are met. If no performance target is met, the SARs lapse without replacement, which means that they will never give rise to any payments.

Overview of long-term component (LTIP)

The following section summarizes the basic information on each of the tranches under the long-term component whose lock-up periods or exercise periods had not yet expired in the 2025 fiscal year:

GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE LTIP TRANCHEs 2019-2025

SAR tranche	Date of grant	Issue price (exercise price) €	Start value of the index	End of the lock-up period	End of the exercise period
2019	September 1, 2019	28.88	371.81	August 31, 2023	August 31, 2025
2020	September 1, 2020	37.83	368.10	August 31, 2024	Not applicable, tranche lapsed
2021	September 1, 2021	58.68	471.78	August 31, 2025	Not applicable, tranche lapsed
2022	September 1, 2022	39.06	434.34	August 31, 2026	August 31, 2028
2023	September 1, 2023	43.26	456.06	August 31, 2027	August 31, 2029
2024	September 1, 2024	37.53	508.75	August 31, 2028	August 31, 2030
2025	September 1, 2025	40.29	551.60	August 31, 2029	August 31, 2031

TOTAL SAR HOLDINGS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2025

	SARs granted in the fiscal year	Total holdings of SARs subject to lock-up period ¹		Total holdings of exercisable SARs ²	
	2025	Number as at December 31, 2025	Value ³ as at December 31, 2025 (€)	Number as at December 31, 2025	Value ³ as at December 31, 2025 (€)
Dr. Tobias Meyer	159,750	607,518	1,257,813	0	0
Oscar de Bok	99,042	412,356	1,030,021	0	0
Pablo Ciano	103,998	410,172	1,014,682	0	0
Nikola Hagleitner	103,998	410,172	1,014,682	0	0
Melanie Kreis	107,118	451,806	1,138,206	0	0
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	107,118	439,500	1,097,465	0	0
John Pearson	103,998	426,126	1,069,502	0	0
Hendrik Venter	91,590	91,590	53,656	0	0

1 SARs already granted, whose lock-up period had not yet expired at the end of the fiscal year in question. Whether and, if so, how many of these SARs become exercisable depends on the achievement of the six share-price based performance targets per tranche.

2 SARs, the lock-up period for which had already expired at the end of the fiscal year in question and which can be exercised up until the expiry of the applicable exercise period. The amount of the specific proceeds depends on how they are exercised and, in addition, is subject to the prior applicability of the agreed caps. Due to all agreed performance targets being missed, the 2020 and 2021 LTIP tranches lapsed without replacement or compensation, meaning they cannot be exercised and will never give rise to any payments.

3 Value of provisions as at December 31, 2025.

The individual payout amounts arising from the exercise of SARs in the 2025 fiscal year are shown in the table titled **Total remuneration for the fiscal year**.

APPLICATION OF MALUS AND CLAWBACK PROVISIONS

In the 2025 fiscal year, the Supervisory Board had no reason to make use of its right to withhold or reclaim variable remuneration components.

LOANS

The company did not extend any loans to Board of Management members.

TARGET REMUNERATION OF THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT IN THE 2025 FISCAL YEAR

The following table titled Target remuneration shows for the Board of Management members active at the end of the 2025 financial year, in addition to the base salary and fringe benefits, the target amount for the annual bonus (including deferral) for the 2025 fiscal year in the event of 100% target achievement; the long-term component is shown at the fair value as of the date of grant. With respect to pension commitments, the pension expense, i.e., the service cost in accordance with IAS 19, is presented. The table also shows the minimum and maximum values that can be achieved as well as the comparison figures for the previous year.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Dr. Tobias Meyer Chief Executive Officer					
	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024	2025¹	Min. 2025	Max. 2025
Base salary	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,500,000
Fringe benefits	33,332	33,332	33,332	33,927	33,927	33,927
Total	1,533,332	1,533,332	1,533,332	1,533,927	1,533,927	1,533,927
Annual bonus: one-year share	600,000	0	750,000 ²	600,000	0	750,000 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	2,100,007	0	4,500,000	2,100,053	0	4,500,000
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	1,500,007	0	3,750,000	1,500,053	0	3,750,000
Annual bonus: deferred with three-year deferral period	600,000	0	750,000 ²	600,000	0	750,000 ²
Total	4,233,339	1,533,332	6,783,332	4,233,980	1,533,927	6,783,927
Pension expense (service cost)	521,103	521,103	521,103	559,470	559,470	559,470
Total remuneration	4,754,442	2,054,435	7,304,435	4,793,450	2,093,397	7,343,397
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			n. a.³			n. a.³

1 As explained in the 2024 remuneration report, Tobias Meyer will receive a base salary of €1,750,000 starting from May 1, 2026, three years after assuming chairmanship of the Board of Management. This salary adjustment was already agreed as part of his appointment as CEO in order to move his remuneration toward a salary level commensurate with his duties and responsibilities.

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

3 The target remuneration cap cannot mathematically be achieved.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Oscar de Bok Global Forwarding, Freight					
	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024	2025¹	Min. 2025	Max. 2025
Base salary	930,000	930,000	930,000	941,625	941,625	941,625
Fringe benefits	20,271	20,271	20,271	22,058	22,058	22,058
Total	950,271	950,271	950,271	963,683	963,683	963,683
Annual bonus: one-year share	372,000	0	465,000 ²	376,650	0	470,813 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,302,004	0	4,185,000	1,306,654	0	4,190,813
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	930,004	0	3,720,000	930,004	0	3,720,000
Annual bonus: deferred with three-year deferral period	372,000	0	465,000 ²	376,650	0	470,813 ²
Total	2,624,275	950,271	5,600,271	2,646,987	963,683	5,625,309
Pension expense (service cost)	322,726	322,726	322,726	340,781	340,781	340,781
Total remuneration	2,947,001	1,272,997	5,922,997	2,987,768	1,304,464	5,966,090
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 In conjunction with the regular salary review after a contract period of three years, the base salary of Oscar de Bok was increased to €976,500 per year as of October 1, 2025, and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system. The maximum achievable remuneration remains unchanged.

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Pablo Ciano eCommerce					
	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024	2025¹	Min. 2025	Max. 2025
Base salary	889,167	889,167	889,167	949,375	949,375	949,375
Fringe benefits	34,882	34,882	34,882	31,511	31,511	31,511
Total	924,049	924,049	924,049	980,886	980,886	980,886
Annual bonus: one-year share	355,667	0	444,584 ²	379,750	0	474,688 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,285,671	0	4,164,584	1,356,291	0	4,380,688
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	930,004	0	3,720,000	976,541	0	3,906,000
Annual bonus: deferred with three-year deferral period	355,667	0	444,584 ²	379,750	0	474,688 ²
Total	2,565,387	924,049	5,533,217	2,716,927	980,886	5,836,262
Pension expense (service cost)	299,004	299,004	299,004	359,492	359,492	359,492
Total remuneration	2,864,391	1,223,053	5,832,221	3,076,419	1,340,378	6,195,754
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 In conjunction with the regular salary review upon contract renewal, the base salary of Pablo Ciano was increased to €976,500 per year as of August 1, 2025, and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system. The maximum achievable remuneration remains unchanged.

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Nikola Hagleitner Post & Parcel Germany					
	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024	2025¹	Min. 2025	Max. 2025
Base salary	895,000	895,000	895,000	953,250	953,250	953,250
Fringe benefits	19,207	19,207	19,207	14,585	14,585	14,585
Total	914,207	914,207	914,207	967,835	967,835	967,835
Annual bonus: one-year share	358,000	0	447,500 ²	381,300	0	476,625 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,288,004	0	4,167,500	1,357,841	0	4,382,625
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	930,004	0	3,720,000	976,541	0	3,906,000
Annual bonus: deferred with three-year deferral period	358,000	0	447,500 ²	381,300	0	476,625 ²
Total	2,560,211	914,207	5,529,207	2,706,976	967,835	5,827,085
Pension expense (service cost)	295,146	295,146	295,146	361,777	361,777	361,777
Total remuneration	2,855,357	1,209,353	5,824,353	3,068,753	1,329,612	6,188,862
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 In conjunction with the regular salary review upon contract renewal, the base salary of Nikola Hagleitner was increased to €976,500 per year as of July 1, 2025, and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system. The maximum achievable remuneration remains unchanged.

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Melanie Kreis Finance					
	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024	2025¹	Min. 2025	Max. 2025
Base salary	1,005,795	1,005,795	1,005,795	1,010,824	1,010,824	1,010,824
Fringe benefits	18,552	18,552	18,552	19,556	19,556	19,556
Total	1,024,347	1,024,347	1,024,347	1,030,380	1,030,380	1,030,380
Annual bonus: one-year share	402,318	0	502,898 ²	404,330	0	505,412 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,408,130	0	4,526,078	1,410,168	0	4,528,592
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	1,005,812	0	4,023,180	1,005,838	0	4,023,180
Annual bonus: deferred with three-year deferral period	402,318	0	502,898 ²	404,330	0	505,412 ²
Total	2,834,795	1,024,347	6,053,323	2,844,878	1,030,380	6,064,384
Pension expense (service cost)	346,360	346,360	346,360	370,396	370,396	370,396
Total remuneration	3,181,155	1,370,707	6,399,683	3,215,274	1,400,776	6,434,780
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 In conjunction with the regular salary review after a contract period of three years, the base salary of Melanie Kreis was increased to €1,035,969 per year as of November 1, 2025, and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system. The maximum achievable remuneration remains unchanged.

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Dr. Thomas Ogilvie HR					
	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024	2025¹	Min. 2025	Max. 2025
Base salary	976,500	976,500	976,500	986,265	986,265	986,265
Fringe benefits	10,566	10,566	10,566	8,597	8,597	8,597
Total	987,066	987,066	987,066	994,862	994,862	994,862
Annual bonus: one-year share	390,600	0	488,250 ²	394,506	0	493,133 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,367,142	0	4,394,250	1,400,344	0	4,516,313
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	976,542	0	3,906,000	1,005,838	0	4,023,180
Annual bonus: deferred with three-year deferral period	390,600	0	488,250 ²	394,506	0	493,133 ²
Total	2,744,808	987,066	5,869,566	2,789,712	994,862	6,004,308
Pension expense (service cost)	340,584	340,584	340,584	356,665	356,665	356,665
Total remuneration	3,085,392	1,327,650	6,210,150	3,146,377	1,351,527	6,360,973
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 In conjunction with the regular salary review upon contract renewal, the base salary of Thomas Ogilvie was increased to €1,005,795 per year as of September 1, 2025, and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system. The maximum achievable remuneration remains unchanged.

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	John Pearson Express					
	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024	2025¹	Min. 2025	Max. 2025
Base salary	930,000	930,000	930,000	976,500	976,500	976,500
Fringe benefits	58,810	58,810	58,810	92,287	92,287	92,287
Total	988,810	988,810	988,810	1,068,787	1,068,787	1,068,787
Annual bonus: one-year share	372,000	0	465,000 ²	390,600	0	488,250 ²
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,302,004	0	4,185,000	1,367,141	0	4,394,250
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	930,004	0	3,720,000	976,541	0	3,906,000
Annual bonus: deferred with three-year deferral period	372,000	0	465,000 ²	390,600	0	488,250 ²
Total	2,662,814	988,810	5,638,810	2,826,528	1,068,787	5,951,287
Pension expense (service cost)	322,681	322,681	322,681	353,276	353,276	353,276
Total remuneration	2,985,495	1,311,491	5,961,491	3,179,804	1,422,063	6,304,563
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			5,150,000			5,150,000

1 In conjunction with the regular salary review after a contract period of three years, the base salary of John Pearson was increased to €976,500 per year as of January 1, 2025, and target remuneration thus adjusted in line with the remuneration system. The maximum achievable remuneration remains unchanged.

2 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

TARGET REMUNERATION

	Hendrik Venter Supply Chain (since August 16, 2025)					
	2024	Min. 2024	Max. 2024	2025	Min. 2025	Max. 2025
Base salary	-	-	-	323,656	323,656	323,656
Fringe benefits	-	-	-	7,557	7,557	7,557
Total	-	-	-	331,213	331,213	331,213
Annual bonus: one-year share	-	-	-	129,462	0	161,828 ¹
Multi-year variable remuneration	-	-	-	989,492	0	3,601,828
LTIP with four-year lock-up period	-	-	-	860,030	0	3,440,000
Annual bonus: deferred with three-year deferral period	-	-	-	129,462	0	161,828 ¹
Total	-	-	-	1,450,167	331,213	4,094,869
Pension expense (service cost) ³	-	-	-	100,333	100,333	100,333
Total remuneration	-	-	-	1,550,500	431,546	4,195,202
Cap on the maximum amount resulting from target remuneration:			-			n. a. ²

1 Without possibility of adjustment due to exceptional developments.

2 The cap of €5.15 million p.a. cannot mathematically be achieved.

3 For Hendrik Venter: pension substitute.

TOTAL REMUNERATION FOR THE 2025 FISCAL YEAR

In addition to the base salary and fringe benefits, the following table includes for the Board of Management members active at the end of the 2025 financial year the amount for the one-year share of the annual bonus based on the achievement of the targets set for 2025 (2025 annual bonus). The amount for Oscar de Bok includes € 34,026 after the adjustment due to exceptional developments (**adjustment due to exceptional developments**). With regard to the medium-term component (deferral), the payout amount reported is that of the deferral whose calculation period ended upon expiry of the fiscal year. In the 2025 fiscal year this was the 2023 deferral. The 2025 annual bonus and the 2023 deferral will be paid to the Board of Management members in the spring of

2026 following the adoption of the consolidated financial statements for the 2025 fiscal year. The tables also provide an indication of the amount paid under the tranches of the long-term component that were exercised in the 2025 fiscal year. Furthermore, for reasons of transparency, the pension expense (service cost according to IAS 19) is also disclosed. Comparison figures for the previous year are stated in all cases.

TOTAL REMUNERATION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR

	Dr. Tobias Meyer Chief Executive Officer		Oscar de Bok Global Forwarding, Freight		Pablo Ciano eCommerce	
	2024	2025	2024	2025	2024	2025
Base salary	1,500,000	1,500,000	930,000	941,625	889,167	949,375
Fringe benefits	33,332	33,927	20,271	22,058	34,882	31,511
Total	1,533,332	1,533,927	950,271	963,683	924,049	980,886
Annual bonus: one-year share	609,271	693,250	391,372	437,553	374,188	443,959
Multi-year variable remuneration ¹	427,754	1,782,027	430,799	364,138	168,487	293,730
Annual bonus: 2022 deferral	427,754	-	430,799	-	168,487	-
Annual bonus: 2023 deferral	-	487,669	-	364,138	-	293,730
2018 LTIP Tranche	-	-	-	-	-	-
2019 LTIP Tranche	-	1,294,358	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	2,570,357	4,009,204	1,772,442	1,765,374	1,466,724	1,718,575
Pension expense (service cost)	521,103	559,470	322,726	340,781	299,004	359,492
Total	3,091,460	4,568,674	2,095,168	2,106,155	1,765,728	2,078,067

1 Due to all agreed performance targets being missed, the 2020 and 2021 LTIP tranches lapsed without replacement or compensation, meaning they will never give rise to any payments.

TOTAL REMUNERATION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR

	Nikola Hagleitner Post & Parcel Deutschland		Melanie Kreis Finanzen		Dr. Thomas Ogilvie Personal	
	2024	2025	2024	2025	2024	2025
Base salary	895,000	953,250	1,005,795	1,010,824	976,500	986,265
Fringe benefits	19,207	14,585	18,552	19,556	10,566	8,597
Total	914,207	967,835	1,024,347	1,030,380	987,066	994,862
Annual bonus: one-year share	331,893	445,771	408,535	467,169	396,636	455,819
Multi-year variable remuneration ¹	190,615	293,730	1,749,061	374,424	940,893	1,074,337
Annual bonus: 2022 deferral	190,615	-	484,108	-	458,761	-
Annual bonus: 2023 deferral	-	293,730	-	374,424	-	351,978
2018 LTIP Tranche	-	-	1,264,953	-	482,132	-
2019 LTIP Tranche	-	-	-	-	-	722,359
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	1,436,715	1,707,336	3,181,943	1,871,973	2,324,595	2,525,018
Pension expense (service cost)	295,146	361,777	346,360	370,396	340,584	356,665
Total	1,731,861	2,069,113	3,528,303	2,242,369	2,665,179	2,881,683

1 Due to all agreed performance targets being missed, the 2020 and 2021 LTIP tranches lapsed without replacement or compensation, meaning they will never give rise to any payments.

TOTAL REMUNERATION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR

	John Pearson Express		Hendrik Venter Supply Chain (since August 16, 2025)	
	2024	2025	2024	2025
Base salary	930,000	976,500	-	323,656
Fringe benefits	58,810	92,287	-	7,557
Total	988,810	1,068,787	-	331,213
Annual bonus: one-year share	379,393	450,728	-	150,396
Multi-year variable remuneration ¹	442,011	735,395	-	-
Annual bonus: 2022 deferral	442,011	-	-	-
Annual bonus: 2023 deferral	-	349,417	-	-
2018 LTIP Tranche	-	-	-	-
2019 LTIP Tranche	-	385,978	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-
Total	1,810,214	2,254,910	-	481,609
Pension expense (service cost) ²	322,681	353,276	-	100,333
Total	2,132,895	2,608,186	-	581,942

1 Due to all agreed performance targets being missed, the 2020 and 2021 LTIP tranches lapsed without replacement or compensation, meaning they will never give rise to any payments.

2 For Hendrik Venter: Pension substitute.

REMUNERATION AWARDED AND DUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1) SENTENCE 2 OF THE AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG – GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT)

The remuneration of the Board of Management in the 2025 fiscal year was consistent with all the stipulations of the remuneration system.

In accordance with the requirements of Section 162 AktG, disclosure of the remuneration awarded and due includes all payments received as well as all payments not received but due in the fiscal year. Accordingly, the table titled **Remuneration awarded and due in accordance with Section 162 (1) sentence 2 of the Aktiengesetz (AktG – German Stock Corporation Act) in the 2025 fiscal year** includes – in addition to base salary and fringe benefits – payments for the 2024 annual bonus made in the spring of 2025. For the medium-term component, the amount paid from the 2022 deferral in 2025 is shown. The table also states the amount paid under the tranches of the long-term component that were exercised in the 2025 fiscal year.

In accordance with the regulatory requirements, the target achievement underlying the 2024 annual bonus paid in 2025, the 2022 deferral and the 2019 LTIP tranche is described below in greater detail.

2024 annual bonus – target achievement

The 2024 annual bonus was based on the remuneration system in the form approved at the Annual General Meeting of May 6, 2021 (agenda item 10). It can be accessed on the [company's website](#). The Board of Management members received an annual bonus whose individual amount reflected the extent to which their predefined targets were achieved, missed or exceeded.

It had the following structure for 2024:

PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 2024

Performance criterion	Weighting	Incentive effect/strategic connection
Group EAC ¹	50%/60% ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key performance indicator for the company Adds a cost of capital component to EBIT to encourage the efficient use of resources and to ensure that the operating business is geared towards increasing value sustainably and generating increasing cash flow
Divisional EAC ¹	0%/10% ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measurement of individual performance in the respective Board departments Incentive for high profitability in the respective division
Free cash flow	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key performance indicator for the company Measure of how much cash the company generates, taking into account payments arising from the Group's operations as well as capital expenditure and lease and interest payments Indicator of how much cash is available to the company for paying dividends, for repaying debt or for other purposes (e.g. funding pension obligations)
E – Realized Decarbonization Effects	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Serves the implementation of the target of reducing CO₂ emissions and offering climate-friendly logistics services
S – Employee Engagement	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures progress in achieving the target of being an Employer of Choice
G – Cybersecurity Rating	10%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Measures the success of cybersecurity management Serves to ensure trustworthy, transparent and legally compliant business practices

1 Including the asset charge on goodwill and before goodwill impairment.

2 Group EAC is weighted at 50% for Board of Management members responsible for the divisions and the EAC of the respective division for which they are responsible at 10%. For the other members of the Board of Management, Group EAC is weighted at 60%.

The individual annual bonus amount for 2024 was calculated as follows:

CALCULATION OF THE ANNUAL BONUS 2024



1 Below a target achievement of 62.5%, the respective target is missed.

2 No use was made of the option to increase/decrease.

In the spring of 2025, the Supervisory Board determined the achievement of the financial targets as follows:

2024 FINANCIAL TARGETS – TARGET ACHIEVEMENT

Target	Target amount €m	Actual amount €m	Target achievement %
Group EAC	2,353	2,207	88.38
Divisional EAC			
Post & Parcel Germany	57	40	0.00
Global Forwarding, Freight	507	362	0.00
Express	1,769	1,701	92.80
Supply Chain	379	436	125.00
eCommerce	41	54	125.00
Group Free cash flow	2,340	2,944	125.00

The sustainability targets were achieved as follows:

2024 NONFINANCIAL TARGETS – TARGET ACHIEVEMENT

Target	Target content	Target amount	Actual amount	Target achievement %
E – Environment	Measures for absolute CO ₂ reduction in the Group – Realized Decarbonization Effects	1,515 ¹	1,584 ¹	122.70
S – Social	Employee Opinion Survey (EOS) – Employee Engagement at Group level	80 ²	82 ²	112.50
G – Governance	Cybersecurity rating	690 ³	750 ³	125.00

1 kt CO₂e WtW.

2 Approval (%).

3 Points.

The following table sets out the overall target achievement determined by the Supervisory Board in the spring of 2025 for the annual bonus for the 2024 fiscal year:

TOTAL TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR ANNUAL BONUS IN THE 2024 FISCAL YEAR (%)

Board of Management member	Target achievement Group EAC	Target achievement Divisional EAC	Target achievement Free cash flow	Target achievement Environment	Target achievement Social	Target achievement Governance	Weighted total target achievement
Dr. Tobias Meyer	88.38	n. a.	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	101.55
Oscar de Bok	88.38	125.00	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	105.21
Pablo Ciano	88.38	125.00	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	105.21
Nikola Hagleitner	88.38	0.00	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	92.71
Melanie Kreis	88.38	n. a.	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	101.55
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	88.38	n. a.	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	101.55
John Pearson	88.38	92.80	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	101.99
Tim Scharwath	88.38	0.00	125.00	122.70	112.50	125.00	92.71

One half of the annual bonus determined on the basis of target achievement was paid out in the spring of 2025 following the adoption of the consolidated financial statements for the 2024 fiscal year. The other half was transferred to the medium-term component. It will be paid out after the consolidated financial statements for the 2026 fiscal year have been adopted in the spring of 2027, but only if the EAC sustainability criterion has been achieved during that period.

2022 deferral

The sustainability phase of the share of the annual bonus deferred in 2022 expired December 31, 2024. The requirement for payout was that EAC at the end of the sustainability phase exceed EAC for the base year or that cumulative EAC be positive during the sustainability phase, i.e. that the asset charge had been earned. The latter was the case.

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR 2022 MEDIUM-TERM COMPONENT

2022	2023	2024	Spring 2025
Annual bonus	Deferral		Determination of target achievement
	CRITERION 1 ¹ : EAC 2024 > EAC 2022		2,207 < 5,117 ² ❌
	or		
	CRITERION 2 ¹ : EAC 2023 + EAC 2024 > 0		2,860 + 2,207 > 0 ✅

1 EAC (€m).

2 EAC 2022 adjusted, see the 2023 Annual Report, note 4 to the consolidated financial statements.

The deferred amounts were paid out in the spring of 2025 following the adoption of the consolidated financial statements for the 2024 fiscal year.

Long-term component (LTIP), 2019 tranche

In the fiscal year, the Board of Management members exercised SARs under the tranche granted in 2019 under the Long-Term Incentive Plan. The Long Term Incentive Plan was approved as part of the remuneration system for the Board of Management at the Annual General Meetings on April 28, 2010, April 24, 2018, and May 6, 2021.

The performance targets for the SAR tranche granted in 2019, from which payouts were made in 2025, were achieved as follows:

TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE 2019 SAR TRANCHE

SAR performance targets	Thresholds	Target achievement
Performance versus STOXX Europe 600	+10%	✅
	+0%	✅
Absolute increase in share price	+25%	✅
	+20%	✅
	+15%	✅
	+10%	✅

All the performance targets were therefore achieved.

ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE OF THE DEUTSCHE POST SHARE AND PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO THE STOXX EUROPE 600


1 Issue price (average price of the Deutsche Post share during the 20 days preceding the issue date).

2 Start value of the STOXX Europe 600 (average value during the 20 days preceding the issue date).

3 Average share price and index value of the last 60 trading days before the end of the lock-up period.

The following table provides an overview of the remuneration awarded and due in the 2025 fiscal year:

REMUNERATION AWARDED AND DUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1) SENTENCE 2 OF THE AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG – GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT) IN THE 2025 FISCAL YEAR

€	Dr. Tobias Meyer Chief Executive Officer		Oscar de Bok Global Forwarding, Freight		Pablo Ciano eCommerce	
Base salary	1,500,000	38.8%	941,625	52.7%	949,375	62.3%
Fringe benefits	33,927	0.9%	22,058	1.2%	31,511	2.1%
Total fixed remuneration components	1,533,927	39.7%	963,683	54.0%	980,886	64.4%
Annual bonus: one-year share	609,271	15.8%	391,372	21.9%	374,188	24.6%
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,722,112	44.6%	430,799	24.1%	168,487	11.1%
Annual bonus: 2022 deferral	427,754	11.1%	430,799	24.1%	168,487	11.1%
2019 LTIP Tranche	1,294,358	33.5%	-	-	-	-
Total variable remuneration components	2,331,383	60.3%	822,171	46.0%	542,675	35.6%
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total remuneration	3,865,310	100.0%	1,785,854	100.0%	1,523,561	100%

**REMUNERATION AWARDED AND DUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1) SENTENCE 2 OF THE AKTIENGESETZ
(AKTG – GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT) IN THE 2025 FISCAL YEAR**

€	Nikola Hagleitner Post & Parcel Germany		Melanie Kreis Finance		Dr. Thomas Ogilvie HR	
Base salary	953,250	64.0%	1,010,824	52.6%	986,265	38.3%
Fringe benefits	14,585	1.0%	19,556	1.0%	8,597	0.3%
Total fixed remuneration components	967,835	64.9%	1,030,380	53.6%	994,862	38.7%
Annual bonus: one-year share	331,893	22.3%	408,535	21.2%	396,636	15.4%
Multi-year variable remuneration	190,615	12.8%	484,108	25.2%	1,181,120	45.9%
Annual bonus: 2022 deferral	190,615	12.8%	484,108	25.2%	458,761	17.8%
2019 LTIP Tranche	-	-	-	-	722,359	28.1%
Total variable remuneration components	522,508	35.1%	892,643	46.4%	1,577,756	61.3%
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total remuneration	1,490,343	100.0%	1,923,023	100.0%	2,572,618	100.0%

**REMUNERATION AWARDED AND DUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1) SENTENCE 2 OF THE AKTIENGESETZ
(AKTG – GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT) IN THE 2025 FISCAL YEAR**

€	John Pearson Express	
Base salary	976,500	42.9%
Fringe benefits	92,287	4.1%
Total fixed remuneration components	1,068,787	47.0%
Annual bonus: one-year share	379,393	16.7%
Multi-year variable remuneration	827,989	36.4%
Annual bonus: deferral from 2022	442,011	19.4%
2019 LTIP tranche	385,978	17.0%
Total variable remuneration components	1,207,382	53.0%
Other	-	-
Total remuneration	2,276,169	100.0%

**REMUNERATION AWARDED AND DUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1) SENTENCE 2 OF THE AKTIENGESETZ
(AKTG – GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT) IN THE 2025 FISCAL YEAR**

€	Hendrik Venter Supply Chain (since August 16, 2025)	
Base salary	323,656	75.0%
Fringe benefits	7,557	1.8%
Pension substitute	100,333	23.2%
Total fixed remuneration components	431,546	100.0%
Annual bonus: one-year share	-	-
Multi-year variable remuneration	-	-
Annual bonus: deferral from 2022	-	-
2019 LTIP tranche	-	-
Total variable remuneration components	-	-
Other	-	-
Total remuneration	431,546	100.0%

REMUNERATION AWARDED AND DUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1) SENTENCE 2 OF THE AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG – GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT) IN THE 2025 FISCAL YEAR

€	Tim Scharwath Global Forwarding, Freight (until August 16, 2025)	
Base salary	615,064	28.1%
Fringe benefits	11,190	0.5%
Total fixed remuneration components	626,254	28.6%
Annual bonus: one-year share	362,116	16.6%
Multi-year variable remuneration	1,198,780	54.8%
Annual bonus: deferral from 2022	458,761	21.0%
2019 LTIP tranche	740,019	33.8%
Total variable remuneration components	1,560,896	71.4%
Other	-	-
Total remuneration ¹	2,187,150	100.0%

¹ For additional information see also [Remuneration in 2025 - Former Board of Management members](#).

OBSERVANCE OF REMUNERATION CAPS

The currently applicable remuneration caps were observed.

The remuneration system applicable in the 2025 fiscal year, which was approved at the Annual General Meeting on May 6, 2021, provides for an overall cap on the amount of payouts. Firstly, this limits the maximum payment amount arising from target remuneration in a given fiscal year (maximum remuneration in accordance with Section 162 (1) no. 7 of the German Stock Corporation Act, “target remuneration cap”). Payments attributable to a given fiscal year are also limited by a maximum amount (“payment cap”).

The target remuneration cap (maximum remuneration in accordance with Section 162 (1) no. 7 of the German Stock Corporation Act) stands at €5.15 million for regular Board of Management members and €8.15 million for the CEO and has applied in this form since 2021. The payment cap also stands at €5.15 million and €8.15 million, respectively, and has applied since the 2022 fiscal year.

The remuneration components are included in the calculation of the caps as follows:

OVERALL CAPS: REMUNERATION COMPONENTS INCLUDED (EXAMPLE)

Target remuneration cap for 2025	Payment cap for 2025
Remuneration components included <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-Term Incentive Plan 2025 tranche • Deferral from 2025 annual bonus • Proportion of 2025 annual bonus for immediate payout • Fringe benefits 2025 • Base salary 2025 • Pension expense (service cost ¹) 2025 	Remuneration components included <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-Term Incentive Plan 2019/2020/2021 tranches ² • Deferral from 2023 annual bonus • Proportion of 2025 annual bonus for immediate payout • Fringe benefits 2025 • Base salary 2025 • Pension expense (service cost ¹) 2025

¹ In case of payout of a pension substitute: amount of pension substitute.

² The payment date depends on the date of exercise within the two-year exercise period.

The final payout amounts from the 2021 target remuneration were determined at the close of the 2025 fiscal year. Adherence to maximum remuneration in accordance with Section 162 (1) no. 7 of the German Stock Corporation Act can therefore be reported on an individualized basis for the first time for target remuneration for the 2021 fiscal year. No reductions were required:

ADHERENCE TO MAXIMUM REMUNERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1) NO. 7 OF THE AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG – GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT) (TARGET REMUNERATION CAP 2021) – ACTIVE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS

€	Maximum remuneration in accordance with Section 162 (1) no. 7 AktG	Remuneration received	Reduction
Dr. Tobias Meyer	5,150,000	1,969,957	0
Oscar de Bok	5,150,000	1,781,341	0
Melanie Kreis	5,150,000	2,341,752	0
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	5,150,000	2,270,817	0
John Pearson	5,150,000	2,029,188	0

ADHERENCE TO MAXIMUM REMUNERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1) NO. 7 OF THE AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG – GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT) (TARGET REMUNERATION CAP 2021) – FORMER BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS

€	Maximum remuneration in accordance with Section 162 (1) no. 7 AktG	Remuneration received	Reduction
Ken Allen	5,150,000	2,456,584	0
Dr. Frank Appel	8,150,000	5,604,625	0
Tim Scharwath	5,150,000	2,229,176	0

In addition to the aforementioned overall caps, the remuneration system has for many years also provided for caps for individual variable remuneration components.

Due to the cap regulations that existed before Section 87a (1) sentence 2 no. 1 AktG took effect, a payment to the former Board of Management member Tim Scharwath in the 2025 fiscal year was reduced by applying the target remuneration cap applicable for the year 2019.

REMUNERATION OF FORMER BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (1) SENTENCE 2 OF THE AKTIENGESETZ (AKTG – GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT)

The Board of Management and Supervisory Board agreed in summer 2025 together with Tim Scharwath that it was the right time for a change in responsibility for the Global Forwarding, Freight division. With Oscar de Bok and Hendrik Venter, two suitable and experienced internal successors were now available for Tim Scharwath's division and the Supply Chain division; neither had been available in the previous year, having been occupied with the development of Strategy 2030 in their respective areas of responsibility. Compensation for Tim Scharwath was based on his employment contract and was significantly below the severance payment cap set by the German Corporate Governance Code. Details are provided in the table below. This shows the benefits paid to all former Board of Management members who have left the company over the past ten years.

REMUNERATION IN 2025 – FORMER BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS

€	Ken Allen		Frank Appel	
Fixed remuneration				
Base salary	-	-	-	-
Fringe benefits	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration				
Annual bonus: one-year share	-	-	-	-
Multi-year variable remuneration	275,871	100%	1,016,518	100%
Annual bonus: deferral from 2022	275,871	100%	1,016,518	100%
2019 LTI tranche	-	-	-	-
Pension payments				
Other payments	-	-	-	-
Total remuneration	275,871	100%	1,016,518	100%

REMUNERATION IN 2025 – FORMER BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS

€	John Gilbert		Tim Scharwath	
Fixed remuneration				
Base salary	-	-	-	-
Fringe benefits	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration				
Annual bonus: one-year share	-	-	-	-
Multi-year variable remuneration	-	-	-	-
Annual bonus: deferral from 2022	-	-	-	-
2019 LTI tranche	-	-	-	-
Pension payments				
	13,273	100%	-	-
Other payments	-	-	3,401,464 ¹	100%
Total remuneration	13,273	100%	3,401,464	100%

1 Settlement of contractual claims: The settlement amount reported was calculated using the base salary and annual bonus (including deferral 2024) for the 2024 fiscal year. The long-term component, the service cost for the company pension scheme and fringe benefits were not included in calculating the amount of the settlement payment.

In addition, twelve pension recipients received total payments of €6.0 million in the 2025 fiscal year.

2. REMUNERATION OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD

Remuneration for the members of the Supervisory Board is governed by Article 17 of the Articles of Association of Deutsche Post AG. The remuneration system was approved by a 99.07% majority of votes cast at the Annual General Meeting on 6 May 2022.

According to the current system, Supervisory Board members receive a fixed annual remuneration in the amount of €100,000, plus an attendance fee. The fact that only fixed remuneration is paid ensures that the Supervisory Board performs its control and monitoring tasks independently.

The Supervisory Board chair and the Supervisory Board committee chairs receive an additional 100% of the remuneration, and the Supervisory Board deputy chair and committee members receive an additional 50%. This does not apply to the Mediation or Nomination Committees.

As in previous years, Supervisory Board members receive an attendance allowance of €1,000 for each plenary meeting of the Supervisory Board or committee meeting that they attended. An attendance allowance is only owed if the total sum of the attendance allowances accruing in a given year does not reach 10% of the total remuneration of the Supervisory Board member, including reimbursements received to cover expenses. The fixed annual remuneration and the attendance allowance become due at the close of the Annual General Meeting in the following fiscal year. Those who only serve on the Supervisory Board or its committees, or act as chair or deputy chair, for part of the fiscal year are remunerated on a pro rata basis. The members of the Supervisory Board are entitled to reimbursement of out-of-pocket cash expenses incurred in the exercise of their office.

A new resolution on the remuneration of the Supervisory Board is due at the 2026 Annual General Meeting. The last adjustment to Supervisory Board remuneration was in 2022. Given that the level of responsibility, complexity of duties and required time commitment of Supervisory Board members have increased further in recent years, a 15% adjustment to Supervisory Board members' base remuneration from €100,000 to €115,000 p.a. is to be proposed to the 2026 Annual General Meeting. Based on the existing multiplier mechanism for chairs and committee members, this will also result in an approximately 15% increase in the total remuneration of the individual Supervisory Board members. The remuneration structure is otherwise to remain unchanged. The proposed increase in remuneration aims to help attract and retain suitable candidates for the Supervisory Board in the future. It is in line with the salary development of employees within the company and with the development of inflation in recent years. It represents a relatively modest adjustment in the context of the market environment.

The remuneration for activities performed in 2025 totaled €3.8 million, as in the previous year. Table B shows the remuneration paid to each Supervisory Board member. In addition, Table A shows the remuneration awarded and due for activities in the 2024 fiscal year – in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act – as “remuneration awarded in 2025.”

**A. REMUNERATION AWARDED IN 2025 WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 162 (1) NO. 1 OF THE AKTIENGESETZ
(AKTG – GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT) ¹**

Members of the Supervisory Board sitting in the fiscal year	Base remuneration	Compensation for membership in committee	Attendance allowance	Total remuneration
	€	€	€	€
Dr. Nikolaus von Bomhard (Chair)	200,000	250,000	21,000	471,000
Andrea Kocsis (Deputy Chair)	150,000	200,000	20,000	370,000
Prof. Dr. Dr. Ann-Kristin Achleitner (since May 3, 2024)	66,393	33,196	12,000	111,589
Silke Busch	100,000	-	6,000	106,000
Dr. Mario Daberkow	100,000	-	6,000	106,000
Ingrid Deltenre	100,000	100,000	15,000	215,000
Jörg von Dosky	100,000	50,000	14,000	164,000
Dr. Hans Ulrich Engel (since May 3, 2024)	66,393	66,393	12,000	144,786
Thomas Held	100,000	100,000	16,000	216,000
Dr. Heinrich Hiesinger	100,000	50,000	12,000	162,000
Prof. Dr. Luise Hölscher ²	100,000	100,000	17,000	217,000
Mario Jacubasch	100,000	50,000	10,000	160,000
Thorsten Kühn	100,000	50,000	10,000	160,000
Ulrike Lennartz-Pipenbacher	100,000	-	6,000	106,000
Yusuf Özdemir	100,000	50,000	13,000	163,000
Lawrence Rosen	100,000	50,000	14,000	164,000
Dr. Katrin Suder	100,000	-	6,000	106,000
Stephan Teuscher	100,000	100,000	17,000	217,000
Stefanie Weckesser	100,000	50,000	14,000	164,000
Stefan B. Wintels	100,000	50,000	12,000	162,000

1 Remuneration for activities in the 2024 fiscal year paid in the spring of 2025.

2 At Luise Hölscher's request, the portion of the remuneration exceeding the amount of €6,100 approved under civil service law was paid directly to the federal treasury.

REMUNERATION AWARDED IN 2025 – FORMER SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS

Supervisory Board members who left in the 2024 fiscal year	Base remuneration	Compensation for membership in committee	Attendance allowance	Total remuneration
	€	€	€	€
Simone Menne (until May 3, 2024)	33,879	16,940	2,000	52,819
Dr. Stefan Schulte (until May 3, 2024)	33,879	33,879	2,000	69,758

B. REMUNERATION FOR ACTIVITIES IN THE 2025 FISCAL YEAR ¹

Members of the Supervisory Board sitting in the fiscal year	Base remuneration	Compensation for membership in committee	Attendance allowance	Total remuneration
	€	€	€	€
Dr. Nikolaus von Bomhard (Chair until May 2, 2025)	66,850	83,562	6,000	156,412
Dr. Katrin Suder (Chair since May 2, 2025)	166,849	133,700	20,000	320,549
Andrea Kocsis (Deputy Chair)	150,000	200,000	24,000	374,000
Prof. Dr. Dr. Ann-Kristin Achleitner	100,000	50,000	14,000	164,000
Dr. Rolf Böisinger ² (ab 2. Juli 2025)	50,137	46,577	5,000	101,714
Silke Busch	100,000	-	7,000	107,000
Dr. Mario Daberkow	100,000	-	7,000	107,000
Ingrid Deltenre	100,000	100,000	17,000	217,000
Jörg von Dosky	100,000	50,000	14,000	164,000
Dr. Hans Ulrich Engel	100,000	100,000	14,000	214,000
Thomas Held	100,000	100,000	20,000	220,000
Dr. Heinrich Hiesinger	100,000	83,425	15,000	198,425
Prof. Dr. Luise Hölscher ² (until June 25, 2025)	48,219	48,221	9,000	105,440
Mario Jacobasch (until December 17, 2025)	96,164	48,084	11,000	155,248
Thorsten Kühn	100,000	50,000	12,000	162,000
Ulrike Lennartz-Pipenbacher	100,000	-	7,000	107,000
Yusuf Özdemir	100,000	50,000	14,000	164,000
Prof. Dr. Georg A. Pölzl (since May 2, 2025)	66,849	-	6,000	72,849
Lawrence Rosen	100,000	50,000	13,000	163,000
Stephan Teuscher	100,000	100,000	21,000	221,000
Stefanie Weckesser	100,000	50,000	13,000	163,000
Stefan B. Wintels	100,000	50,000	15,000	165,000

1 Will be paid out in the spring of 2026.

2 At the request of Luise Hölscher and Rolf Böisinger, any portion of the remuneration exceeding the amount of €6,100 approved under civil service law will be paid directly to the federal treasury.

3. REMUNERATION OF THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT MEMBERS, THE SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS AND THE EMPLOYEES ON A FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT BASIS RELATIVE TO THE COMPANY'S EARNINGS PERFORMANCE

The following table sets out the remuneration awarded and due in the individual fiscal years to the Board of Management and Supervisory Board members active in the fiscal year, the remuneration awarded and due in the individual fiscal years to the Board of Management and Supervisory Board members who have left the Company in the last ten years and the remuneration of the other employees together with selected earnings indicators. Earnings are shown in terms of consolidated net profit, Group EAC and Group FCF, as reported in the respective fiscal year. These figures are the Group's main performance indicators and therefore also constitute material performance criteria for the annual bonus of the Board of Management. In accordance with the regulatory requirements that call for the use of the company's earnings performance for this purpose, Deutsche Post AG's net profit for the fiscal year has been added. The average total remuneration of employees, which has been included for comparison purposes, was calculated on the basis of staff costs of DHL Group divided by the average number of DHL Group employees for the year and adjusted on the basis of full-time equivalents. The Board of Management was not included in calculating staff costs or the number of employees. To ensure consistency in the comparison with the remuneration awarded and due to the Board of Management and Supervisory Board members, pension scheme expenses have also been eliminated.

DEVELOPMENT OF REMUNERATION AND EARNINGS

	Percentage change 2020/2021	Percentage change 2021/2022	Percentage change 2022/2023	2024	Percentage change 2023/2024	2025	Percentage change 2024/2025
Development of the total remuneration of the Board of Management members							
€							
Dr. Tobias Meyer	28	29	162	2,427,728 ¹	-40	3,865,310	59
Oscar de Bok	35	22	28	1,681,113	-1	1,785,854	6
Pablo Ciano	-	n. a. ²	192	1,217,779	12	1,523,561	25
Nikola Hagleitner	-	n. a. ²	143	1,207,937	13	1,490,343	23
Melanie Kreis	464	-81	179	2,983,381 ³	-41	1,923,023	-36
Dr. Thomas Ogilvie	238	-61	174	2,278,039 ³	-50	2,572,618	13
John Pearson	21	35	179	1,762,852 ¹	-63	2,276,169	29
Hendrik Venter (since August 16, 2025)	-	-	-	-	-	431,546 ⁴	n. a. ²
Development of the total remuneration of the Supervisory Board members							
€							
Dr. Nikolaus von Bomhard (Chair)	1	-1	40	468,000	0	471,000	1
Andrea Kocsis (Deputy Chair)	1	0	39	364,000	0	370,000	2
Prof. Dr. Dr. Ann-Kristin Achleitner (since May 3, 2024)	-	-	-	-	-	111,589 ⁴	n. a. ²
Silke Busch	-	-	-	69,301 ⁴	n. a. ²	106,000	53
Dr. Mario Daberkow	3	-1	39	104,000	0	106,000	2
Ingrid Deltenre	16	17	40	212,000	-1	215,000	1
Jörg von Dosky	3	-1	100	161,000	7	164,000	2
Dr. Hans Ulrich Engel (since May 3, 2024)	-	-	-	-	-	144,786 ⁴	n. a. ²
Thomas Held	2	8	70	213,000	1	216,000	1
Dr. Heinrich Hiesinger	92	29	36	159,000	1	162,000	2

DEVELOPMENT OF REMUNERATION AND EARNINGS

	Percentage change 2020/2021	Percentage change 2021/2022	Percentage change 2022/2023	2024	Percentage change 2023/2024	2025	Percentage change 2024/2025
Prof. Dr. Luise Hölscher	-	-	n. a. ²	213,000 ⁵	32	217,000 ⁵	2
Mario Jacobasch	3	13	83	158,000	0	160,000	1
Thorsten Kühn	n. a. ²	170	40	158,000	0	160,000	1
Ulrike Lennartz-Pipenbacher	3	-1	39	104,000	0	106,000	2
Yusuf Özdemir	-	n. a. ²	329	161,000	0	163,000	1
Lawrence Rosen	n. a. ²	165	100	160,000	7	164,000	3
Dr. Katrin Suder	-	-	-	69,301 ⁴	n. a. ²	106,000	53
Stephan Teuscher	16	17	35	216,000	1	217,000	0
Stefanie Weckesser	4	-3	38	161,000	-1	164,000	2
Stefan B. Wintels	-	-	n. a. ²	159,000	52	162,000	2

Development of the total remuneration of Board of Management members who left the company in the year under review

€							
Tim Scharwath (until August 15, 2025)	207	-61	161	2,338,352 ³	-48	5,588,614 ⁶	139

Development of the total remuneration of Board of Management members who left the company in previous years

€							
Ken Allen	167	-4	-61	1,198,459 ⁷	-67	275,871 ⁷	-77
Dr. Frank Appel	2	-44	607	6,147,764 ⁷	-84	1,016,518 ⁷	-83
John Gilbert	-	-	-	-	-	13,273	n. a. ²

Development of the total remuneration of former Supervisory Board members

€							
Simone Menne (until May 3, 2024)	4	-3	38	159,000	-1	52,819 ⁴	-67
Dr. Stefan Schulte (until May 3, 2024)	3	-3	39	211,000	0	69,758 ⁴	-67

Development of the average total remuneration of the workforce

€							
Total workforce of DHL Group ⁸	2	6	3	49,419	4	50,539	2

Earnings performance

€m							
Consolidated net profit ⁹	70	6	-31	3,332	-9	3,501	5
Group EAC	136	-1	-44	2,207	-23	2,354	7
Free cash flow Group	61	-25	-4	2,944	0	3,201 ¹⁰	9
Deutsche Post AG net profit (HGB)	35	-34	7	2,825	1	2,656	-6

1 No payouts under the long-term component.

2 Comparison with previous year not possible.

3 Lower payouts under the long-term component compared with the previous year.

4 Pro rata remuneration in the year of entry/exit.

5 At Luise Hölscher's request, any portion of the remuneration exceeding the amount of €6,100 approved under civil service law was paid directly to the federal treasury.

6 Includes settlement of contractual claims in the amount of €3,401,464.

7 Remuneration from trailing remuneration components.

8 Not adjusted for currency effects; change excluding currency effects (all years calculated @AOP 2025): 2020/2021: 2%; 2021/2022: 3%; 2022/2023: 5%; 2023/2024: 4%; 2024/2025: 4%.

9 After deduction of noncontrolling interests.

10 Without M&A.

REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR ON THE AUDIT OF THE REMUNERATION REPORT IN ACCOR- DANCE WITH SECTION 162 (3) AKTG

To Deutsche Post AG, Bonn

Audit Opinion

We conducted a formal audit of the remuneration report of Deutsche Post AG, Bonn, for the financial year January to 31 December 2025 to assess whether the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) have been made in the remuneration report. In accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG, we have not audited the content of the remuneration report.

In our opinion, the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG have been made, in all material respects, in the accompanying remuneration report. Our audit opinion does not cover the content of the remuneration report.

Basis for the Audit Opinion

We conducted our audit of the remuneration report in accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG and in compliance with the *IDW Auditing Standard: Audit of the Remuneration Report pursuant to Section 162 (3) AktG (IDW AuS 870 (09.2023))*. Our responsibilities under those requirements and this standard are further described in the “Auditor’s Responsibilities” section of our report. Our audit firm has applied the requirements of the IDW Quality Management Standards. We have fulfilled our professional responsibilities in accordance with the German Public Auditor Act (WPO) and the Professional Charter for German Public Auditors and German Sworn Auditors (BS WP/vBP) including the requirements on independence.

Responsibilities of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board

The executive board and the supervisory board are responsible for the preparation of the remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that complies with the requirements of Section 162 AktG. In addition, they are responsible for such internal control as they have determined necessary to enable the preparation of a remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud (i.e. fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets) or error.

Auditor’s Responsibilities

Our objective is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG have been made, in all material respects, in the remuneration report, and to express an opinion on this in a report on the audit.

We planned and conducted our audit in such a way to be able to determine whether the remuneration report is formally complete by comparing the disclosures made in the remuneration report with the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG. In accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG, we have neither audited the correctness of the content of the disclosures, nor the completeness of the content of the individual disclosures, nor the adequate presentation of the remuneration report.

Düsseldorf, 4 March 2026

Deloitte GmbH

Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft

Prof. Dr. Frank Beine
Wirtschaftsprüfer
(German Public Auditor)

Sebastian Paus
Wirtschaftsprüfer
(German Public Auditor)